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Wreck  of  the  Steamer 
Valencia 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


-:^-t. 


WRECK  OPTfiE  STEAME 

VALENCIA 


REPORT  TO  THE   PRESIDENT 

OF  THE  FEDERAL  COMMISSION  OF 

INVESTIGATION 


/  /y-"^^. 


APRIL  14,  1906 


WASHINGTON  :  :  GOVERNMENT   PRINTING  OFFICE  :  :  1906 


WRECK  OF  THE  STEAMER 

VALENCIA 


REPORT  TO   THE    PRESIDENT 

OF  THE   FEDERAL   COMMISSION   OF 

INVESTIGATION 


APRIL   14,  1906 


LA,  J.       \.o 


mrr\\^t>''c^ 


]lCK.\i3./\C-\CL. 


WASHINGTON  :  :  GOVERNMENT    PRINTING   OFFICE  :  :  1906 


VK 


5^ 


V^  il 


REPORT  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  FEDERAL  COMMISSION 
OF  INVESTIGATION  UPON  THE  WRECK  OF  THE  STEAMER 
VALENCIA. 


CHAPTER  I. 

APPOINTMENT  AND   PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  COMMISSION. 

On  Febnian-  7,  1906,  the  President  issued  the  following  order: 

TiiK  White  House, 
ll^ashi)igtoji,  February  7,  ipo6. 

Sir:  You  are  hereby  directed  to  instruct  Lawrence  O.  Murray,  Assist- 
ant Secretar}^  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  and  Herbert  Knox  Smith, 
Deputy  Conunissioner  of  Corporatious,  as  weh  as  Captain  Wihiani  T. 
Burwell,  U.  S.  Nav}',  who  will,  for  this  purpose,  be  detailed  for  service 
in  your  Department  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to  proceed  to  Seattle, 
Washington,  and  there  to  make  thorough  and  complete  investigation  of 
all  the  circumstances  attending  the  wreck  of  the  steamer  Valencia  and  the 
cause  or  causes  thereof,  and  any  misconduct,  negligence,  or  dereliction 
of  duty  on  the  part  of  anyone  related  thereto  and  having  any  bearing 
U]-)on  the  loss  of  life  occasioned  by  said  disaster;  and  also,  as  you  may 
direct,  to  investigate  such  other  matters  bearing  upon  the  safety  of 
traffic  in  navigable  waters  of  the  United  States  in  that  vicinity  and  the 
effectiveness  and  sufficiency  of  the  present  aids  to  navigation  along  said 
waters,  and  to  make  full  report  thereon  with  reconnnendations  for  such 
departmental  or  legislative  action  as  may  be  indicated  by  said  report  and 
findings. 

Ver>'  truly,  yours, 

Theodore  Roosevelt. 

The  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor. 

In  accordance  therewith,  on  the  same  day,  the  Federal  Commis- 
sion of  Investigation  upon  the  wreck  of  the  steamer  Valencia  was 
formed  by  the  appointment,  as  members  of  the  Commission  from 
the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  of  Lawrence  O.  Murray, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  and  Herbert  Knox 
Smith,  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  and  from  the  Navy 
Department  of  Captain  William  T.  Burwell,  LT.  S.  Navy,  com- 
mandant of  Puget  Sound  Navy  Yard. 

3 

877580 


4  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX  ''VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

Mr.  ]\Iurrav  was  appointed  chairman  of  the  Commission  and  IMr. 
Smith  secretary.  The  nature  of  its  work  was  defined  in  the  fol- 
lowing order  : 

Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 

Office  of  the  Secretary, 

Washington,  February  7,  igo6. 

Sir:  Pursuant  to  the  direction  of  the  President,  dated  February  7, 
1906,  you  are  herebj^  instructed  to  proceed  to  Seattle,  Washington,  at 
once,  and  there  and  in  that  vicinity,  in  company  with  Captain  William  T. 
Burwell,  U.  S.  Navy,  connnandant  of  Puget  Sound  Navy  Yard,  and 
Air.  Herbert  Knox  Smith,  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  make 
thorough  and  complete  inv^estigation  of  all  the  circumstances  attending 
the  wreck  of  the  steamer  Vale7icia,  and  to  inquire  into  the  cause  or  causes 
thereof  and  into  any  misconduct,  negligence,  or  dereliction  of  duty  on 
the  part  of  anyone  related  thereto  and  having  any  bearing  on  the  loss 
of  life  occasioned  by  said  disaster. 

You  will  also,  as  your  discretion  dictates,  take  up  and  investigate  such 
other  matters  bearing  upon  the  safety  of  traffic  upon  the  navigable 
waters  of  the  United  States  adjoining  the  coast  of  Washington  and  the 
Straits  of  Juan  de  Fuca,  and  the  entrance  thereof,  together  with  the  par- 
ticular points  of  danger  to  such  traffic  presented  by  such  waters,  and  the 
question  of  sufficienc}'  and  effectiveness  of  the  present  light-houses,  fog 
signals,  and  life-saving  stations,  and  of  other  aids  to  navigation  along 
said  waters. 

And  upon  all  the  matters  so  considered  by  you  you  will  make  full 
report,  accompanying  such  report  by  reconnnendations  for  such  depart- 
mental or  legislative  action  as  you  may  deem  to  be  required  by  your 
findings  for  the  better  protection  of  life  and  property  concerned  in  such 
traffic. 

Respectfully,  yours,  V.  H.  Metcalf, 

Secretary. 

To  Lawrence  O.  Murray, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor. 

On  Februar)-  9,  1906,  Messrs.  Murray  and  Smith  left  Washington, 
arriving  in  vScattle  on  the  e\-ening  of  P'ebruary  13.  On  Wednes- 
day, F'ebrnary  14,  Captain  Ihirwell  joined  them,  and  the  Commission 
opened  its  work  h\-  a  conference  with  a  committee  of  the  Seattle 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  upon  the  request  of  said  committee 
arranged  that  a  representative  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  should 
sit  witli  the  said  Commission  for  the  ])urpose  of  aiding  it.  William 
H.  Gorham,  e.sq.,  attorney  at  law,  was  designated  by  the  Chamber  of 
Commerce  for  this  purpose,  and  attended  all  the  hearings  of  the  Com- 
mission, and  also  acconi])anicd  the  Commission  on  its  trip  to  the  scene 
of  the  wreck. 

The  Commission  commenced  taking  testimony  at  2  o'clock  p.  m. 
February   14  and   carried   on   its  work   continnonsK-   until    i    p.   m. 


REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX   "VALENCIA"   DISASTER.  5 

March  i,  when  the  Coiiiinissioii  adjourned.  Tlie  testinion\-  of  two 
witnesse.s  was  taken  later  b\-  Captain  Burwell,  after  the  departure 
of  Messrs.  Murray  and  Smith  from  Seattle,  and  INIr.  Smith  took 
the  testimon\-  of  one  witness  in  San  Francisco  on  March  4.  On 
Febrnary  17  the  Connnission  took  the  lig-ht-honse  tender  Columbine 
and  proceeded  down  the  Sound  to  Neah  Bay,  near  the  entrance  to 
the  Straits,  and  on  the  following  da)-,  the  i8th,  cruised  around  Cape 
Flattery,  examining  the  coast  and  testing  the  fog  signals  at  the 
Cape,  and  then  proceeded  to  a  point  several  miles  west  of  Carmanah 
Light,  examining  the  coast,  and  then  returned  to  Neah  Bay,  where 
they  spent  the  night  of  the  i8th.  On  the  19th  they  inspected 
Waaddah  Island,  in  Neah  Bay,  with  a  view  to  a  proper  location  for 
a  life-saving  station,  and  then  returned  to  Seattle. 

On  February  23,  after  full  public  notice,  a  public  hearing  was 
given  and  opportunit)-  afforded  to  all  who  desired  to  present 
suggestions  and  arguments  for  needed  improvements  in  the 
nature  of  light-houses,  fog  signals,  life-saving  service,  etc.,  and  a 
number  of  individuals  and  persons  representing  organizations  inter- 
ested in  the  traflfic  of  Puget  Sound  and  the  Pacific  coast  appeared. 
A  nmnber  of  suggestions  and  recommendations  were  also  submitted 
to  the  Commission  iii  the  form  of  written  memoranda. 

The  hearings  of  the  Commission  for  the  first  two  days  were  held 
in  a  room  pro\-ided  by  the  district  attorney  in  a  building  occupied 
bv  the  Federal  authorities,  and  thereafter  Hon.  Cornelius  H.  Han- 
ford,  judge  of  the  United  States  District  Court,  ver\-  courteously 
allowed  the  Commission  the  use  of  his  court  room,  where  all  subse- 
quent hearings  were  held.  All  hearings  and  the  taking  of  testi- 
mony were  public,  and  were  attended  by  a  considerable  number  of 
citizens,  various  commercial  organizations  deputing  representatives 
to  be  present.  Sixty  witnesses  were  examined.  The  testimony  in 
the  matter  covered  about  1,860  typewritten  pages  and  included  more 
than  30  exhibits. 

The  Cotnmission  also  commenced  a  reinspection  of  the  American 
steamers  coming  into  Puget  Sound.  P'or  that  purpose  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Robert  E.  Coontz,  U.  S.  Navy,  Lieutenant  Arthur 
Crenshaw,  U.  S.  Na\\-,  and  Carpenter  William  F.  Hamberger. 
U.  S.  Navy,  were  detailed  h\  the  Secretary  of  the  Nav>-  with  instruc- 
tions to  report  the  result  of  the  reinspection  to  the  Commission. 

The  Commission  desires  to  express  its  high  appreciation  of  the 
exceptional   courtesy   and    good   will   displayed    toward    it    by  the 


O  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

citizens  of  Seattle  and  adjoining  towns,  and  especially  the  great 
assistance  rendered  to  it  by  William  H.  Gorham,  esq.,  of  Seattle, 
thronghont  the  extent  of  its  work ;  also  the  assistance  of  Mr.  Josiah 
Collins,  of  the  Seattle  Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  the  courtesy  of 
the  Seattle  Post-Intelligencer,  which  furnished  the  Commission  with 
enlarged  copies  of  a  number  of  valuable  photographs  taken  by  one 
of  its  staff  near  the  scene  of  the  wreck  and  shortly  after  its  occurrence. 
In  general,  the  Commission  met  with  hearty  cooperation  from  all 
persons,  and  many  witnesses  appeared  at  the  request  of  the  Commis- 
sion at  considerable  inconvenience  to  themselves.  Siibstantially  all 
the  survivors  of  the  wreck — officers,  crew,  and  passengers — were 
examined  (except  a  few  who  had  departed  for  their  homes  in  distant 
places  before  the  arrival  of  the  Commission),  and  also  a  number  of 
gentlemen  expert  in  questions  of  navigation  and  various  persons  who 
were  present  in  sundry  capacities  upon  the  vessels  that  went  to  the 
rescue  of  the  Valencia  after  the  wreck  ;  so  that  the  Commission  feels 
that  it  has  in  its  possession  practically  all  the  essential  facts  that  in 
any  way  bear  upon  the  subject-matter  of  its  inquin,-.  The  Commis- 
sion was  wholly  without  compulsory  power  to  compel  the  attend- 
ance of  witnesses  and  without  funds  to  remunerate  them,  but  so 
general  was  the  public  cooperation  in  the  matter  that  these  limita- 
tions were  not  serious. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE    VALENCIA   AND   HER   OWNERS. 

The  passenger  steamer  Valencia^  owned  by  the  Pacific  Coast  Com- 
pany, was  bnilt  in  1882  by  Cramps  in  Philadelphia.  She  was  reg- 
istered as  of  the  port  of  New  York,  but  for  man\-  years  had  engaged 
exchisivel)-  in  the  Pacific  coast  trade.  Her  allowed  ronte  was  the 
Pacific  Ocean,  coast,  and  Bering  Sea.  She  was  licensed  to  carr}' 
286  passengers.  Master,  Oscar  M.  Johnson.  Her  last  annnal  inspec- 
tion was  on  April  27,  1905,  at  Seattle.  In  November,  1905,  she  was 
reinspected,  and  on  January  3,  1906,  she  was  again  specially  rein- 
spected  at  San  Francisco. 

Though  owned  b}-  the  Pacific  Coast  Company,  she  was  operated 
by  a  subsidiary  corporation  thereof,  the  Pacific  Coast  Steamship 
Company,  as  were  all  the  fleet  controlled  by  the  said  Pacific  Coast 
Company. 

The  Pacijic  Coast  Company. — This  is  the  parent  company  and 
was  organized  in  New  Jersey  in  1898.  As  testified  to  by  the  manager 
of  the  company,  its  capitalization  is  $1,000,000  first  preferred  stock, 
$5,000,000  second  preferred  stock,  $7,000,000  common  stock,  and 
$5,000,000  in  bonds.  The  said  company  owned  at  the  time  of 
the  disaster  all  the  stock  and  bonds  in  certain  subsidiary  companies, 
as  follows:  Pacific  Coast  Steamship  Company,  Pacific  Coast  Rail- 
way Company,  and  the  Columbia  and  Puget  Sound  Railway 
Company ;  also  various  coal  mines,  wharves,  real  estate,  lumber 
yards,  etc.,  situated  in  vSeattle,  central  California,  Juneau,  vSkag- 
way,  and  elsewhere.  The  various  vessels  comprising  the  entire 
fleet  of  the  Pacific  Coast  Company  and  its  constituent  companies 
were  all  operated  by  the  Pacific  Coast  Steamship  Company  as  agent. 
The  said  parent  company  has  paid  dividends  since  1900,  at  first  4 
per  cent,  then  5  per  cent,  and  of  late  years  6  per  cent. 

The  Pacific  Coast  Steainship  Company. — This  is  a  California  cor- 
poration with  capital  stock  of  $2,000,000,  owned  by  the  Pacific 
Coast  Companv  since  1898.  It  pa)s  over  its  entire  surplus  to  the 
Pacific  Coast  Company  as  dividends  and  has  earned  a  surplus  since 
1897  or  1898.  J.  C.  Ford  is  president  of  said  company  and  W.  E. 
Pearce  its  manager. 


8  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

The  entire  fleet  thus  controlled  by  the  Pacific  Coast  Company, 
but  operated  by  the  Pacific  Coast  Steamship  Compan}-,  is  composed 
of  about  twenty  vessels,  engaged  in  freight  and  passenger  business 
along  the  coast  from  southern  California  to  points  in  Alaska. 
About  two-thirds  of  the  entire  business  of  their  coast  traffic  is  in 
freight  and  the  other  third  in  passenger  business.  A  regular  line 
of  steamers  is  run  by  the  company  between  San  Francisco,  Vic- 
toria, and  Seattle.  The  Valencia  was  not  one  of  the  steamers  regu- 
larl}'  engaged  on  this  run,  but  had  been  recently  placed  on  the  run 
from  San  Francisco  to  Seattle  to  take  the  place  of  one  of  the  regu- 
lar vessels,  the  Piiebla^  laid  up  for  repairs,  and  had  just  made  one 
round  trip  thereon  previous  to  the  wreck. 

DESCRIPTION    OF    VESSEL. 

The  Valencia  was  an  iron,  single-screw,  steam-steering,  steam 
vessel;  length  252  feet,  beam  34  feet,  draft  19  feet  without  load. 
She  had  3  cargo  holds,  4  water-tight  metal  bulkheads,  2  boilers, 
with  6  furnaces  altogether,  and  was  allowed  a  steam  pressure  of  100 
pounds.  She  was  equipped  with  6  lifeboats  and  i  working  boat, 
with  a  total  carrying  capacity  of  181  persons  (each  lifeboat  being 
swung  on  davits),  and  3  life  rafts,  with  a  total  carrying  capacity  of 
44  persons.  Two  of  these  rafts  were  of  tule,  a  buoyant  Californian 
reed.  She  had  368  life-preservers,  315  of  which  were  of  tule  and 
the  rest  of  cork;  a  L\lc  line-firing  gun  of  the  standard  pattern,  with 
1,500  feet  of  line;  4  anchors,  with  90  fathoms  of  chain  for  each,  and 
was  otherwise  equipped  as  the  law  and  regulations  required.  The 
vessel  was  valued  at  about  $175,000,  exclusive  of  cargo. 

She  had  three  decks — a  saloon  deck,  mostly  open  to  the  weather; 
below  that  the  main  deck,  and  below  that  the  lower  deck.  Impo.sed 
upon  the  saloon  deck  were  two  series  of  cabins,  forming  houses.  On 
top  of  the  after  series  of  cabins,  known  as  the  "after-house,"  was  a 
hurricane  deck,  and  on  top  of  the  forward  series  of  cabins  a  so-called 
"fiddler's  deck."  The  lifeboats  in  question  were  carried  three  on 
each  side,  the  four  forward  ones  on  a  lc\cl  with  the  fiddler's  deck 
and  the  two  rear  ones  on  toj)  of  the  after-house  on  the  hurricane 
deck.  The  life  rafts  were  also  on  the  said  hurricane  deck,  as  was  the 
working  boat.  The  l)()ats  were  numbered  as  follows:  Nos.  i,  3)  5, 
and  7  were  on  the  starboard  side,  counting  from  forward;  Nos.  2,  4, 
and  6  were  on  the  port  side,  counting  from  forward;  No.  7  was  the 
working  boat,  which  was  carried  on  the  starboard  side  near  No.  5. 

The  pilot  house  was  impo.sed  on  the  saloon  deck  at  the  front  of 


REPORT   OK   COMMISSION    o.N   ''VALEN'CIA"  DISASTER.  9 

the  forward  series  of  cabins.  Just  aft  of  tlie  pilot  house,  on  a  level 
witli  its  roof,  was  the  brid«^^e,  and  just  aft  of  the  l)ridf^e,  and  on  the 
same  level,  was  the  chart  house,  the  ])rido;e  beinj^-  alxjut  90  to  100 
feet  from  the  bow. 

The  speed  of  the  ves.sel  was  about  1 1  knots. 

She  carried  on  this  trip  i  master,  i  first  officer,  3  mates,  4  enj^n- 
neers,  and  a  crew  as  follows:  In  the  deck  department,  i  boatswain, 
I  carpenter,  4  quartermasters,  8  .seamen,  i  watchman,  and  i  boy, 
makino;^  inclusive  of  tlie  5  deck  officers,  21  ;  in  the  en«-ineer's  depart- 
ment, 6  firemen,  3  oilers,  and  3  coal  passers,  makino,  inclu.sive 
of  the  4  enjrineer  officers,  16;  in  the  steward's  department,  3  stewards, 
I  stewardess,  4  cooks,  2  pantrymen,  i  barkeeper,  i  porter,  10  wait- 
ers, and  3  me.ssmen,  making- a  total  of  25,  and  in  the  purser's  depart- 
ment, I  ])urser  and  2  freight  clerks,  making  a  total  of  3.  A  total 
crew  list  of  65. 

Inasmuch  as  the  passenger  list  for  this  trip  is  not  entireh-  accu- 
rate, and  the  bodies  of  many  of  the  victims  were  never  found,  and 
man\-  of  tho.se  found  were  incapable  of  identification,  an  exact 
enumeration  of  the  personnel  is  not  possible.  The  fig-ures  given 
below  are,  however,  sub.stantially  correct  and  can  not  differ  by  more 
than  two  or  three  from  the  actual  facts. 

When  the  I  'alcncia  left  San  Franci.sco  on  the  trip  on  which  she 
was  wrecked,  she  carried  46  first-cla.ss  passengers  and  62  .second- 
class  pas.sengers.  It  appears  that  tliere  were  on  the  ve.s.sel  i  ;  women 
in  all,  and  a  few  children. 

Of  the  total  officers  and  crew  of  65,  40  were  lost  and  25  sa\ed. 
Of  the  total  pa.s.senger  list  of  108,  96  w^ere  lost  and  12  .saved.  The 
ratio  of  pa.ssengers  lost  to  number  of  passengers  was  therefore  88 
per  cent,  and  of  crew  lost  to  number  of  crew  61  per  cent. 

In  all,  of  the  total  ship's  company-  of  173,  136  were  lost  (a  per- 
centage of  78)  and  2)1  saved.      All  the  women  and  children  peri.shed. 


CHAPTER  III. 

BRIEF  DESCRIPTION   OF  VOYAGE. 

The  Valencia  left  her  dock  at  San  Francisco  at  11.20  a.  m.  Satur- 
day, January  20,  1906,  bound  for  Victoria,  B.  C,  and  Seattle.  She 
proceeded  up  the  coast  on  her  usual  route,  keeping  a  course  gener- 
alh'  parallel  to  the  line  of  the  coast  and  within  from  5  to  20  miles 
thereof,  at  various  points,  intending,  when  she  reached  Cape  Flattery, 
to  turn  in  around  said  cape  to  Puget  Sound  and  proceed  down  that 
Sound  to  her  point  of  destination.  Cape  Flattery,  where  she  would 
have  made  the  turn  to  the  east,  is  about  667  miles  from  the  entrance 
to  the  Golden  Gate  and  San  Francisco  Harbor.  Leaving  San  Fran- 
cisco at  the  time  she  did,  she  would,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events, 
have  reached  Cape  Flatter}'  at  the  entrance  to  the  Straits  some  time 
within  a  few  hours  before  or  after  midnight  Monday,  the  third  day. 

She  proceeded  up  the  coast  without  especial  incident,  and  early 
Sunday  morning  passed  Cape  Mendocino,  about  190  miles  north  of 
San  Francisco,  which  cape  and  the  light  thereon  were  the  last  land 
and  light  that  were  clearly  seen  by  the  Valencia  until  she  went 
ashore.  From  that  point  the  weather  was  hazy,  and  neither  by 
night  nor  day  did  she  see  any  lights  thereafter  or  hear  any  fog 
signals. 

Keeping  her  course  almost  entireh-  by  compass  and  dead  reckon- 
ing by  the  log,  she  failed  to  locate  correctly  her  position  in  relation 
to  Cape  Flattery,  missed  the  entrance  to  the  Straits  and  Puget 
vSound,  and  went  ashore  at  about  11.50  p.  m.  Monday,  January 
22,  on  the  southwest  coast  of  Vancouver  Island.  It  appeared 
that  slic  fir.st  struck  a  rock  or  ledge  a  few  hundred  yards  offshore, 
where  she  hung  for  a  few  minutes,  and  during  these  few  minutes 
the  vessel  turned  upon  this  rock  as  a  pivot,  and  then,  coming  o£F, 
drifted  or  was  driven  inshore  so  that  in  her  final  berth  she  lay  at 
substantially  right  angles  to  the  shore  line,  with  her  bow  heading 
out  to  sea  and  her  stern  not  over  a  hundred  yards  from  the  cliff 
whicli  formed  the  shore  line.  She  remained  in  that  position  with 
life  on  board  her  until  Wednesda}'  noon  or  i  o'clock  p.  m.,  January 
24,  breaking  up  gradually  up  to  that  time,  and  then  her  upper 
works  went  to  pieces  completely,  so  as  to  be  wholly  submerged 

except  for  her  two  masts  and  the  tops  of  her  boilers,  and  so  as  to  be 
10 


REPORT    OF   COMMISSION    ON   "VALENCIA"  DISASTER.  II 

entirely  untenable  for  luinian  life,  except  for  a  few  people  in  the 
ringing.  During  this  period,  from  Monday  night  to  Wednesday 
noon,  varions  attempts  were  made,  both  b)-  the  ship's  company  and 
by  ontside  parties,  to  rescue  those  on  board,  as  will  later  be  set  forth 
in  detail. 

The  wind  was  variable  during  her  voyage,  but  was  of  considerable 
strength  from  the  southeast  when  she  struck  and  for  two  days  there- 
after, and  the  sea  was  fairly  heavy.  The  weather  was  cold  and 
wet.  The  coast  line  where  the  Valencia  lay  is  substantially  a  con- 
tinuous rock  cliff,  rising  almost  sheer  from  the  water,  about  loo  feet 
in  hei"-ht,  covered  with  trees  and  beaten  bv  a  verv  heav\'  surf. 
The  exact  location  was  about  midway  between  Cape  Beale,  9^ 
miles  to  the  west,  and  Carmanah  Light,  12  miles  to  the  east,  these 
being  the  two  nearest  lights  and  the  nearest  inhabited  places  except 
the  small  Indian  village  Clo-oose. 

FIRST  PERIOD— DETAILED    DESCRIPTION   OF   NAVIGATION   OF 

THE   VESSEL. 

The  details  of  the  na\agation  of  the  vessel  from  the  time  she 
left  vSan  Francisco  to  the  time  she  struck  have  been  gathered  by 
the  Commission  mainly  from  the  testimou}-  of  Mr.  Peterson,  the 
second  officer  of  the  Wilencia^  all  the  log  books  having  been  lost  and 
Mr.  Peterson  being  the  onlv  surviving  deck  officer.  His  testimonv 
as  to  soundings  was  corroborated  substantially  by  the  four  seamen 
who  took  the  soundings,  and  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  check  his 
testimony  as  to  distances  and  courses  it  appears  to  be  exceptionally 
accurate.  Mr.  Peterson  had  made  this  trip  something  over  a  hundred 
times. 

The  facts  relating  to  the  navigation  as  thus  gathered  are  as  fol- 
lows :  From  San  Francisco  to  Cape  Mendocino  the  trip  was  made 
on  the  usual  course  and  mostly  in  sight  of  land,  the  weather  being 
fairly  clear.  Cape  Mendocino  was  reached  about  half  past  5  Sunday 
morning  and  was  passed  at  a  distance  of  10  miles  offshore.  This  cape 
forms  a  point  where  the  regular  coasting  course  turns,  and  it  is  usual 
for  vessels  making  this  trip  to  lay  a  course  substautialh'  without 
variation  from  this  point  nearly  to  Umatilla  Light-ship,  which  is  only 
14  miles  south  of  the  entrance  to  Puget  Sound  and  is  distant  from 
Cape  Mendocino  about  463  miles.  Having  thus  passed  Cape 
Mendocino  the  J^alencia  laid  a  coiirse  substantially  north  20°  west, 
magnetic,  and  maintained  this  course  until  the  following  night, 
Monday,  9  p.  m.  Mr.  Peterson  testified  that  the  course  of  north  18° 
west  actually  indicated   b}'  the  ship's  compass  was  equivalent  to  a 


12  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

real  compass  course  of  north  20°  west,  showing  a  westerly  deviation 
of  2°  in  the  J'a/cncia's  compass.  From  Cape  Mendocino  until  the 
vessel  struck  no  land  or  lights  were  seen  nor  any  fog  signals  heard 
except  the  signals  blown  by  the  vessel  herself. 

An  entr\-  was  made  in  the  log  book  by  the  captain  that  Cape 
Blanco  had  been  passed  at  5.20  p.  m.  Sunday,  log  showing  335 
miles  from  Golden  Gate,  but  Mr.  Peterson  was  of  the  opinion  that 
this  entry  was  largeh-  conjectural,  as  he  did  not  find  that  anyone 
had  actually  seen  Cape  Blanco.  On  Sunday  afternoon  about  3 
o'clock,  before  passing  Cape  Blanco,  the  wind,  which  had  been 
from  the  north,  had  become  a  strong  breeze  from  the  southeast,  and 
was  maintained  in  this  direction  during  the  rest  of  the  voyage. 
Althoiigh  no  "point  of  departure"  had  been  gained  north  of  Cape 
Mendocino,  which  was  seen  earh'  Sunday  morning,  and  no  land  or 
lights  had  been  observed,  the  captain  did  not  begin  soundings  until 
6  o'clock  Monday  evening,  and  from  that  time  and  until  half  past  9 
that  evening  soundings  were  taken  every  half  hour,  but  no  bottom 
was  found,  and  the  records  simply  show  that  at  each  cast  240 
fathoms  of  wire  had  been  paid  out.  This  would  indicate,  at  the 
speed  the  vessel  was  going  and  allowing  for  the  slant  of  the  wire, 
that  she  was  in  at  least  from  80  to  100  fathoms  of  water. 

At  9  p.  m.  on  Monday  the  captain  evidently  felt  that  he  should 
be  nearing  the  Umatilla  Light-ship.  It  is  the  usual  custom  of  nav- 
igators on  this  route  to  pick  up  this  light-ship,  either  by  sight  or  by 
soundings,  and  use  that  point  as  a  point  of  departure  for  Cape  Flat- 
tery, which  is  14  miles  farther  north.  It  seems  probable  that  Cap- 
tain Johnson  was  estimating  his  position  by  the  points  where  he 
thoueht  the  vessel  ou";ht  to  be  at  o-iven  times  in  her  schedule.  At 
9  o'clock  Mondav  night  the  log  showed  that  the  vessel  had  run  652 
miles,  which  would  have  brought  her,  if  not  influenced  by  winds  or 
current,  sul)stantially  opposite  Umatilla  Light-ship;  but  for  some 
reason,  wholly  unexplained,  Captain  Johnson  was  of  the  opinion,  as 
he  .stated  to  Mr.  Peterson,  that  the  log  was  "overrunning" — that  is, 
that  the  vessel  was  not  going  as  fast  as  the  log  indicated. 

His  phrase  was  that  "the  log  overruns  6  per  cent."  In  other 
words,  if  the  log  showed  on  Monday  at  9  ]).  m.  a  distance  of  652  miles 
he  thought  it  was  in  excess  b)-  40  miles  and  the  vessel  had  actually 
covered  onl}-  612  miles  oxer  the  ground,  a  distance  which  would 
have  placed  the  vessel  about  40  miles  .south  of  Umatilla  Light-ship 
at  9  o'clock  Monday  night.  As  near  as  can  be  gathered  this  was 
tlic-  belief  on  which  Captain  John.son  acted,  inasmuch  as  at  that 
time  lie  tunud  in  eastward  toward  the  coast,  and  it  is,  as  a  matter 


KI'.l'ORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON    "  \'A  I.I'.NCIA"   DISASTKK.  I3 

of  fact,  the  custom  of  masters,  wlien  they  are  unable  to  see  the  land 
or  H(^hts  on  this  run,  to  endeavor  to  i)ick  u])  a  peculiar  line  of 
sonndin,^s  which  extend  al)()nt  40  miles  south  of  rmatilla  Li<j;-ht- 
shi])  and  which,  if  .gotten,  indicate  absolutel\-  the  position  of  the 
vessel,  as  such  sonndinirs  can  not  be  obtained  anywhere  else  on 
that  run. 

It  should  be  stated  at  this  jioint  that  Captain  b)hnson's  assump- 
tion that  the  log^  had  overrun  was  a  fatally  mistaken  one,  and  that  on 
the  other  hand,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  lo<»-  ])robably  underran,  and 
while  it  showed  at  9  o'clock  Monday  evening-  a  distance  run  of  652 
miles  the  stronj:^  current  toward  the  northward  which  prevails  at 
this  season  of  the  >ear,  and  which  of  course  was  not  registered  by 
the  log,  had  given  additional  speed  to  the  vessel,  and  instead  of 
being,  at  9  o'clock,  40  miles  south  of  l^matilla,  as  the  captain 
thought,  she  was  probably  at  least  opposite  to  or  north  of  that  point. 

Acting,  however,  on  his  aforesaid  belief.  Captain  Johnson,  at  9 
o'clock  Monday  evening,  turned  eastward  toward  the  coast,  chang- 
ino-  his  course  from  north  20°  west  to  north  one-half  east  and  sound- 
ing  as  he  went,  in  order  to  pick  up  the  shore.  These  courses  are 
"  magnetic, "  as  are  all  others  given  herein.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  the  last  soundings  which  he  got  previous  to  9  o'clock  gave  no 
bottom.  At  9.30  o'clock,  while  still  maintaining  a  course  of  north 
one-half  east,  he  got  a  sounding  with  the  tubes  (which  gives  an 
absolutely  accurate  depth)  of  80  fathoms.  The  next  sounding,  at  10 
o'clock,  was  60  fathoms.  At  this  point  he  again  changed  his  course 
ver\-  slightly  toward  the  westward  and  made  a  course  of  north  three- 
cpiarters  west.  As  Mr.  Peterson  says,  this  is  the  usual  course  taken 
from  Umatilla  Light  to  Cape  Flattery  Light,  which  marks  the 
entrance  to  the  Sound.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  only  explana- 
tion for  this  last  change  in  course,  north  three-quarters  west,  is  that 
Captain  Johnson  assumed  that  at  10  o'clock  he  was  somewhere  near 
Umatilla  Light-ship. 

Proceeding  on  the  last  course,  at  10.30  p.  m.  he  got  a  sounding  of 
56  to  60  fathoms;  at  10.45,  ^o  fathoms;  at  11,  60  fathoms;  at 
11.15,  40  fathoms,  and  at  11.35,  30  fathoms,  all  of  these  being  a 
character  of  soundings  that  should  have  put  him  intensely  on  his 
guard,  as  they  were  not  characteristic  of  the  run  from  Umatilla  to 
Cape  Flattery.  Evidently  Captain  Johnson  felt  this,  for  at  11.35 
he  again  changed  his  course  sharply  toward  the  west  and  away 
from  the  coast,  taking  a  course  of  north  35°  west.  A  sounding  at 
11.45  Rfive  24  fathoms.     This  change  in  course  was  taken  too  late, 


14  REPORT   OF   COMMISSION   ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

however,  as  within  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  Mr.  Peterson,  who  was  on 
the  bridge,  saw  a  dark  object  ahead,  and  both  he  and  the  captain 
ordered  the  wheel  hard  to  starboard,  throwing  the  vessel's  head  to  the 
west,  and  within  two  or  three  minutes  thereafter  she  struck  the  rock. 

It  is  practically  impossible  to  lay  out  accurately  the  course  of  the 
Valencia  upon  the  chart.  We  have  fairly  reliable  evidence  as  to 
compass  couises  and  soundings  and  log  readings-,  but  both  the 
compass  courses  and  the  log  readings,  especially  the  latter,  might  be 
and  doubtless  were  invalidated  by  the  presence  of  a  strong  current 
toward  the  northward  from  an  unknown  distance  down  the  coast, 
coupled  with  a  strong  southeast  wind,  the  sea  striking  the  vessel  on 
its  starboard  quarter  and  driving  her  forward  and  somewhat  west- 
ward out  of  her  course,  and  finally,  after  passing  Cape  Flattery  and 
when  off  the  mouth  of  the  Straits,  by  the  existence  of  additional 
strong  currents  issuing  from  the  mouth  of  the  Straits  and  running 
along  westward  and  northward  parallel  with  the  shore  of  Vancouver 
Island. 

The  pilot  chart  of  the  North  Pacific  Ocean  for  January,  1906, 
shows  currents  running  northward  close  along  the  coast  from  Cape 
Blanco  over  the  entire  course  of  the  Valencia  of  from  i  to  3  knots 
an  hour.  No  such  chart  was  on  board  the  Valencia^  nor  does  it 
appear  that  Captain  Johnson  or  au)-  of  his  officers  made  any  allow- 
ance for  such  current.  This  failure  to  allow  for  this  so-called 
"inshore  current"  proceeding  northward  is  the  most  unexplainable 
fact  encountered  by  the  Commission.  It  appears  that  most  masters 
are  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  existence  of  this  current  under  normal 
conditions  in  the  winter,  and  that  while  this  current  is  erratic  and 
occasionally  ceases  entirely,  and  sometimes  is  even  reversed  and 
proceeds  southward,  nevertheless  its  average  course  is  northward 
and  of  considerable  strength,  and  its  direction  and  force  is  sufficiently 
well  known  so  that  most  masters  are  on  their  g-uard  agfainst  it.  It 
is  very  hard  to  say,  therefore,  how  Captain  Johnson  could  have 
assumed  that  his  log  was  overrunning  6  per  cent.  It  is  obvious  that 
if  the  vessel  was  in  a  current  proceeding  in  the  same  direction  as  the 
course  of  the  vessel  the  log  would  not  ''overrun,"  but  would  "under- 
run,"  i.  e.,  would  fail  to  register  the  entire  progress  of  the  vessel 
over  the  ground,  as  the  log  could  only  register  the  progress  of  the 
ves.sel  through  the  water,  and  the  water  itself,  in  the  shape  of  this 
inshore  current,  was  proceeding  northward. 

Wliatever  may  be  the  explanation  for  Captain  Johnson's  mistake, 
however,  the  fact  that  he  made  this  mistake  in  regard  to  the  current 


REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX   "VALKNCIA"  DISASTKR.  1 5 

is  the  fniidainental  cause  of  the  disaster,  as  it  clearly  appears  that 
when  the  vessel  struck  she  was  at  least  30  miles  farther  advanced 
to  the  northward  than  Captain  Johnson  supposed  she  was,  and  this 
discrepancy  was  almost  certainly  due  to  his  failure  to  allow  for  the 
current  and  also  for  the  following  wind. 

The  steamer  Edith^  coming  up  substantially  the  same  course  a 
few  hours  later  than  the  /  'aloicia  on  the  same  day,  had  a  quite  simi- 
lar experience  with  an  unusual  northward  current,  and  very  nearly 
ran  ashore  within  a  short  distance  of  the  place  where  the  Valencia 
struck.  The  difference  in  the  results  to  the  two  vessels,  one  of 
which  was  wrecked  and  the  other  saved,  was  due  to  the  action  of  the 
mastei'  of  the  Edith,  who,  when  he  found  he  was  out  of  his  course 
and  was  not  certain  where  he  was,  turned  sharph'  out  to  sea  and 
cruised  about  until  he  was  able  to  locate  his  position. 

Such  action  Captain  Johnson  failed  to  take,  and  upon  his  improper 
navigation  must  rest  the  primary  responsibilit}-  for  the  disaster. 

Only  one  explanation  has  occurred  to  the  Commission  for  the  fail- 
ure of  Captain  Johnson  to  allow  for  the  northward  set  of  the  current. 
It  appears  that  while  this  current  is  northward  in  the  winter  these 
conditions  are  more  or  less  reversed  in  the  summer,  and  the  current 
either  becomes  of  no  importance  or  actually  turns  toward  the  south- 
ward under  the  influence  of  a  different  class  of  winds.  Captain 
Johnson's  experience  on  this  particular  run  commenced  substantially 
in  ^lay,  1905,  so  that  he  had  had  more  experience  up  to  the  time  of 
the  wreck  with  the  summer  conditions  than  with  the  winter  condi- 
tions. He  ma)'  have  confused  the  two  and  may  have  been  calcula- 
ting on  the  current  going  southward,  as  would  be  the  case  in  summer. 
It  certainly  appears  that  he  had  some  such  idea  fixed  in  his  mind  to 
such  an  extent  that  he  even  disregarded  tlie  evidence  of  his  own  log 
when  it  was  plain  at  certain  points  that  the  log  was  not  overrun- 
ning. For  instance,  the  actual  distance  from  the  entrance  of  San 
Francisco  Harbor  to  Cape  ^Mendocino  is  189  miles,  and  the  log 
showed  exactly  this  distance,  189,  when  they  passed  Cape  Alendo- 
cino.  Furthermore,  it  also  appears  that  there  was  an  entry  in  the 
log  book  that  they  had  passed  Cape  Blanco,  and  the  log  at  that 
time  showed  2^:2^=^  miles,  when  the  actual  distance  is  i^^)^  and  this 
was  at  a  time  when  the  wind  was  against  them.  Both  of  these 
facts  showed  clearh-  that  the  log  at  the  time  the>'  passed  Cape 
Blanco  was  not  overrunning  at  all,  but  was  substantially  correct. 

The  supposed  speed  of  the  Valencia  was  about  ii  knots  an 
hour,  but  it  appears  from  various  facts  that  during  this  trip  she  was 


1 6  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

making  more  than  that.  Her  rnn  from  the  Golden  Gate  to  Cape 
Mendocino  and  Cape  Blanco  was  made  at  an  average  rate  of  abont 
I'i/i  knots  an  hour.  Her  average  rate  for  the  entire  run  till  the  time 
she  struck  was  at  the  rate  of  ii  )^  knots  an  hour,  and  in  this  period 
must  be  included  a  considerable  length  of  time  when  she  was  run- 
ning at  half  speed  or  less,  so  that  when  going  at  full  speed  that  trip 
it  is  safe  to  say  that  she  was  making  over  the  ground  at  least  12 
knots  an  hour. 

It  seems  probable  from  the  course  made  b\-  Captain  Johnson  that 
he  was,  however,  actually  calculating  on  an  overrun  of  the  log  of 
about  6  per  cent.  Both  Peterson  and  the  fourth  mate  apparently 
had  doubts  about  this  assumption,  and  Peterson  suggested  to  the 
captain  that  possibly  the  log  was  not  overrunning,  but  was  assured 
that  it  was.  Evidently,  however,  nobody  on  the  vessel  supposed 
they  were  as  far  north  as  they  were,  because  it  was  not  until  at  least 
a  day  after  they  had  struck  the  shore  of  Vancouver  Island  that  any- 
one (and  then  only  those  who  got  ashore)  knew  that  they  were  on 
Vancouver  Island,  and  the  impression  of  the  captain  and  the  officers 
and  crew  was  that  the}-  were  somewhere  on  the  American  shore 
south  of  Cape  Flattery,  and  their  actions  after  they  struck  all  bear 
out  this  impression. 

It  appears  from  the  evidence  that  there  was  a  lookout,  or  station 
man,  on  duty  in  the  bow  of  the  ship  at  this  time.  This  man's  testi- 
mony can  not  be  had,  as  he  is  dead.  Mr.  Peterson,  however,  says 
that  this  lookout  ga\-e  no  warning  of  the  approach  of  land  and  did 
not  call  out  at  all,  and  this  was  probably  the  fact.  The  place  where 
the  lookout  stood  was  about  100  feet  forward  of  the  bridge,  where  the 
captain  and  the  first  officer  were.  It  would  be  hard  to  distinguish 
the  lookout  from  the  bridge  on  a  night  as  dark  as  that  on  which  the 
Valencia  struck.  Mr.  Peterson  thinks  he  saw  him  moving  about, 
but  is  not  .sure.  It  is  certainly  singular  that  this  lookout,  whose 
.sole  business  it  was  to  keep  watch  ahead,  should  not  have  reported 
^•'"'l  ;'l'^  ;id.  It  appears,  however,  that  through  a  wholly  improper 
arrangement  of  watches  this  lookout  had  been  on  duty  since  6  o'clock 
that  evening,  and  liad  Ik-cu  there  nearly  six  hours  at  the  time  the 
ves.sel  struck.  He  would  have  gone  off  duty  at  12  o'clock  and  been 
relieved  by  the  other  station  man. 

Tliis  lookout  is  .said  to  liave  been  a  good  man — young,  active,  and 
faithful— but  the  Connnission  is  firmly  of  the  ojiiniou  that  no  man, 
however  good,  sliould  be  ke])t  on  lookout  duty  for  six  hours  continu- 
oush-,  esi)ecia]ly  under  circum.stances  of  damjerous  navio-ation       A 


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REPORT   OF   COMMISSION   ON  "VALENCIA"  DLSASTER.  1 7 

man  under  such  continued  strain  might  easily  fall  asleep  or  half 
isleep  so  as  to  be  useless  as  a  lookout,  and  e\cn  if  he  were  not  asleep 
it  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  such  long  continued  atten- 
tion will  dull  the  faculties  so  that  a  man  would  be  much  less  quick 
and  attentive  than  a  fresh  man.  The  Connnission,  therefore,  is 
obliged  to  express  its  strong  disapproval  of  any  system  which 
requires  a  man  to  maintain  lookout  duty  for  any  such  period  of  time 
as  six  hours,  and  it  is  believed  that  such  system  in  this  case  was 
responsible  for  the  fact  that  land  was  not  reported  by  the  lookout. 
25639—06 2 


CHAPTER  IV. 

SECOND  PERIOD— AFTER  THE  VESSEL  STRUCK  AND   BEFORE  THE 
ARRIVAL   OF   THE   RESCUE   FLEET. 

As  soon  as  the  vessel  struck,  or  within  a  few  minutes  thereafter, 
soundings  were  taken  in  the  bilges  of  the  middle  compartment 
w^hich  showed,  first  i  foot  of  water,  then  2  feet,  and  then  6  feet,  all 
within  a  period  of  five  or  six  minutes.  These  soundings  were 
reported  to  the  captain,  who  was  still  on  the  bridge,  and  he  evidently 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  vessel  would  sink  and  must  be 
beached,  and  he  therefore  informed  Peterson  that  he  w'as  going  to 
beach  her.  The  engines  were  started  full  speed  astern  and  the 
vessel  was  beached  stern  foremost,  as  previoush^  stated. 

The  exact  location  where  the  \essel  struck  is  at  a  point  substan- 
tially 22  miles  from  Cape  Flatter}-,  northwest  three-quarters  west, 
magnetic,  12  miles  northwest  along  the  coast  from  Carmanah  Light 
and  9  yi  miles  southeast  along  the  coast  from  Cape  Beale  Light.  The 
location  of  the  wreck  is  indicated  on  Plate  I.  The  coast  at  this  point 
is  precipitous  and  rock)-,  as  appears  by  Plate  II,  and  the  interior  in  this 
vicinity  appears  to  be  wholly  uninhabited,  nor  is  there  any  method 
of  communication  or  travel  in  either  direction,  except  a  telegraph 
and  telephone  line  strung  on  trees  running  from  Cape  Beale  on  the 
west  to  Carmanah  Light  on  the  east  and  connected  at  occasional 
intervals  with  small  huts  known  as  "  linemen's  huts,"  apparently 
for  the  convenience  of  the  linemen  whose  duty  it  is  to  keej)  this 
line  in  order.  No  trail  accompanied  the  telegraph  wire,  except  so 
far  as  its  direction  was  marked  bv  occasional  blazes  on  the  trees. 
The  forest  and  vegetation  is  extremely  dense,  and  in  places  almost 
imjK-netrablc  except  b)-  chopping  a  path.  A  number  of  small 
streams  and  rivers  go  into  the  sea  along  this  strip  of  coast,  and  these 
streams  are  often  impassable  in  raiu)-  weather.  Only  in  a  \-ery  few 
places  is  it  po.ssible  to  ])roceed  along  the  shore  in  front  of  the  line 
of  bluffs,  and  then  only  at  low  water.  Much  of  the  travel  along 
this  stri])  of  coast  mu.st  be  inland,  back  of  tliis  line  of  bluffs. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  it  would  be  hard  to  find  a  place  so  comparativeh- 
near  to  civilization  and  yet  practically  so  inaccessible  and  isolated 
as  the  place  where  the  /  'alencia  went  ashore. 


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REPORT   OF   COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER.  19 

Captain  Jolmson,  however,  was  correct  in  his  belief  that  the  vessel 
mnst  be  beached,  as  the  filling-  of  any  one  of  the  three  large  cargo 
holds  would  probably  have  served  to  sink  her.  His  next  order  was  to 
lower  the  boats  to  the  saloon  rail  and  lash  them  there.  This  order 
was  given  at  substantially  the  same  time  he  decided  to  beach  the 
vessel.  Based  upon  this  order  there  then  followed  a  complete  and 
disastrous  failure  in  the  use  of  the  boats.  It  appears  that  for  some 
reason  no  boat  drill  had  been  held  on  board  the  l^alc/nia  this  trip, 
it  being  apparently  the  intention  of  the  captain  to  have  his  drill  after 
getting  into  Puget  Sound.  '  Out  of  the  65  members  of  the  officers 
and  crew  onh-  32  had  been  on  the  J  'aloicia  on  the  previous  trip,  and 
while  a  fire  drill  had  been  held  on  the  previous  trip  only  two  of  her 
six  lifeboats  had  been  swung  out  and  lowered  in  that  drill,  with  the 
result  that  such  drill  was  incomplete  both  as  to  the  trying  of  the 
boats  and  tackle  and  in  giving  practice  to  only  two  out  of  six  boat 
crews.  There  was,  therefore,  onh-  an  incomplete  and  partial  drill 
on  the  previous  trip  of  the  l^alcncia  and  no  drill  at  all  on  the  trip 
when  she  was  wrecked.  Many  of  the  crew  did  not  know  to  which 
boat  the}'  were  assigned. 

The  natural  consequences  followed  when  the  captain  gave  the 
order  to  lower  the  boats.  The  exact  occurrences  are  difficult  to 
ascertain,  inasmuch  as  the  electric  lights  went  out  shortly  after  the 
vessel  struck,  and  in  the  confusion,  darkness,  wind,  and  rain  the 
surviving  witnesses  naturallv  were  not  clear  as  to  exactlv  where 
they  were  or  what  happened.  In  general,  however,  certain  facts 
appear.  The  order  of  the  captain  was  incompletely  carried  out  and 
he  himself  did  not  see  to  its  execution,  and  the  first  officer,  who  was 
with  him  at  the  time,  also  failed  to  see  to  its  execution.  j\Iore  than 
half  of  the  seamen  of  the  crew,  men  best  fitted  to  handle  the  boats, 
for  some  reason  stayed  below  awaiting  orders  until  several  of  the 
boats  had  been  lowered  or  capsized. 

Meantime  others  of  the  crew — firemen,  waiters,  etc. — with  the  aid 
of  passengers  lowered  the  boats  to  the  saloon  rail  (except  No.  5, 
which  was  not  swung  out  at  all  that  night),  but  failed  to  lash  the 
boats  there,  and  then  when  the  passengers  got  into  the  boats,  through 
misunderstanding  of  orders,  failure  of  tackle,  or  possibly  the  cutting 
of  the  falls  h\  excited  persons,  three  of  the  boats  were  cockbilled ; 
that  is,  one  end  was  dropped  suddenly  before  the  other,  and  all  the 
passengers  in  these  boats  were  spilled  into  the  sea  and  only  i  res- 
cued. Two  other  boats  were  successfully  lowered  and  launched, 
but  having  only  one  or  two  of  the  crew  in  each  of  them  they  were 


20  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

practically  helpless  and  were  quickly  turned  broadside  to  the  waves 
and  capsized,  and  out  of  probably  20  or  30  occupants  only  9  got 
ashore  from  these  two  boats. 

There  is  also  some  evidence  to  the  effect  that  a  third  boat  was 
successfully  launched  at  this  time,  but  if  so  she  probably  capsized 
later,  as  no  one  in  her  survived  and  her  fate  is  unknown.  One  raft 
also  slid  overboard. 

The  net  result  of  the  handlinor  of  the  boats  on  the  nio-ht  of  the 
disaster  was  that  not  over  a  dozen  people  got  ashore  alive.  Prob- 
ably from  40  to  60  were  drowned  in  the  various  accidents  to  the 
boats  and  onh-  one  boat  was  left  on  the  vessel.  It  seems  fairly 
clear  from  the  experience  the  next  morning,  when  this  last  remain- 
ing boat  went  out  successfully  through  the  siu'f  with  compara- 
tively little  difficulty,  that  Mr.  Peterson  is  correct  when  he  says 
that  if  the  boats  had  not  been  launched  at  all  until  the  next  morn- 
ing the}'  then  could  have  gone  out  successfully  and  saved  each 
a  reasonable  boat  load  of  passengers.  This  terrible  failure  in  the 
use  of  the  boat  equipment  was  due,  in  part,  to  lack  of  proper  drill 
and  in  part  to  the  order  of  the  captain,  by  which  the  boats  were 
lowered  to  the  rail  where  the  passengers  could  get  into  them  with- 
out proper  crews  at  the  boats  to  see  that  the  boats  were  protected 
from  the  inrush  of  passengers  and  that  they  were  properly  launched 
and  manned. 

It  is  probable  that  after  the  failure  of  the  boats,  all  of  which  must 
have  occurred  inside  of  half  an  hour  from  the  time  the  vessel  struck, 
there  were  left  on  board  about  90  to  no  persons.  The  vessel  was 
substantially  in  darkness  after  the  electric  lights  went  out,  except 
for  two  or  three  small  hand  lamps.  The  passengers  at  first  congre- 
gated mainl)-  in  the  dining  saloon  and  were  there  given  a  little  food, 
though  most  of  the  supplies  had  by  that  time  become  submerged 
and  were  inaccessible  in  the  lower  part  of  the  vessel.  By  the  time 
the  morning  of  Tuesday  came,  however,  the  water  had  begun  to 
come  into  this  saloon,  and  the  passengers  went  either  on  top  of  the 
hurricane  deck  or  into  the  staterooms  on  the  saloon  deck  ;  evidently 
the  majority  of  llnni  went  on  the  hurricane  deck. 

Throughout  the  entire  night  there  appears  to  have  been  little  or 
no  panic  on  the  ])art  of  the  passengers  after  the  first  natural  alarm 
when  the  ves.sel  struck,  and  c\en  this  first  alarm  does  not  seem  to 
have  taken  the  shape  of  an  unreasoning  or  uncontrollable  panic. 
It  is  true  that  many  of  the  passengers  hastened  to  get  into  the  boats, 
but  this  was  only  natural,  inasmuch  as  the  boats  had  been  lowered 


REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX   '' \A  I.I'.XCIA"   DISASTI'.R.  21 

to  the  saloon  rail  apparenth-  for  that  j)iirpose  and  there  was  no  one 
there  to  restrain  thcin.  They  seem  to  ha\-e  been  reasonable  and 
coniparativeh-  cool,  and  conld  have  been  easily  controlled  by  efficient 
officers  and  crew,  trained  nnder  proper  boat  drills. 

Several  times  dnrinj;-  the  ni_i»-ht  rockets  and  flares  were  set  off  by 
way  of  distress  signals  and  to  enable  the  officers  to  get  a  view  of  the 
coast  line,  which  was  ver}-  indistinct.  In  the  course  of  some  of 
these  operations  the  captain  had  his  right  hand  broken  and  practi- 
cally disabled  b\-  an  exploding  rocket. 

Along-  toward  Tuesda^•  morning  it  was  evident  that  the  vessel  was 
beginning  to  break  np.  The  hull  remained  comparatively  intact, 
but  the  forward  house,  to  wit,  the  pilot  house,  chart  house,  and 
liridofc,  beofan  to  g-o,  and  the  sea  coming:  in  over  the  bow  was 
gradually  eating  away  the  upper  works  of  the  vessel.  Early  Tues- 
day morning,  probably  between  8  and  9  o'clock,  the  captain  called 
for  a  volunteer  crew  to  take  the  last  remaining  boat  and  make  an 
attempt  to  follow  up  the  coast  and  land  a  crew  from  the  boat  so  as 
to  come  back  along  the  shore  and  take  a  line  to  be  shot  from  the 
vessel. 

A  crew  of  se\en  volunteered  in  charge  of  McCarthy,  the  boat- 
swain, and  No.  5  boat  was  lowered  on  the  starboard  side  of  the  ves- 
sel, made  its  way  out  through  the  breakers,  and  proceeded  westward 
along  the  shore  looking  for  a  place  on  which  to  land.  The  testimony 
of  those  who  watched  this  boat  go  out,  and  also  of  those  in  the  boat, 
seems  to  indicate  that  comparatively  little  difficulty  was  encountered 
in  getting  away.  They  shipped  ver\-  little  water,  not  enough  to 
require  bailing,  and  wdiile  hard  pulling  w^as  necessary  they  did  not 
seem  to  have  been  in  any  serious  danger  at  any  time,  and  the}-  crossed 
the  line  of  breakers  possibly  100  yards  out  beyond  the  bow  of  the 
vessel  and  then  turned  and  proceeded  nearly  in  the  trough  of  the 
sea  westward  and  with  very  little  trouble  up  the  coast,  occasionalh' 
having  to  turn  the  bow'  of  the  boat  to  an  exceptionally  large  incom- 
ing sea. 

After  the  breakers  w^ere  passed  the  boatswain  was  able  to  steer 
with  the  rudder.  This  boat  proceeded  along  the  shore  without  find- 
ing a  place  to  land  until  they  reached  what  is  known  as  Seabird 
Rocks,  near  the  entrance  to  Pachena  Ba>-,  and  finally  made  a  land- 
ings on  the  westward  shore  of  Pachena  Ba\-  near  its  mouth  on  a  short 
strip  of  beach,  without  losing  any  life,  and  about  7  miles  north- 
west of  the  wreck.  They  reached  this  point  about  1 2  or  i  o'clock 
Tuesday  afternoon. 


22  REPORT    OF   COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

Up  to  this  point  apparently  every  one  on  the  vessel  had  believed 
that  she  was  on  the  Washington  coast  south  of  Cape  Flatter}'.  But 
this  volunteer  crew  after  landing  began  looking  for  a  trail,  and 
shortly  saw  on  the  beach  a  sign  reading  "Three  miles  to  Cape 
Beale."  This  was  their  first  definite  knowledge  that  they  were  on 
the  shore  of  Vancouver  Island.  They  found  this  trail  leading 
toward  Cape  Beale  and  decided  to  follow  it  westward  and  not  to 
attempt  to  go  back  to  the  wreck  overland,  becatise  there  appeared  to 
be  no  feasible  way  of  getting  back,  the  telegraph  line  running  back 
through  the  impenetrable  woods,  and  the  way  along  shore  being 
barred  by  high  cliffs.  They  therefore  proceeded  in  the  other  direc- 
tion westward  and  arrived  at  Cape  Beale  light-house  at  3  o'clock 
Tuesday  afternoon,  and  there  informed  the  keeper  about  the  wreck 
and  its  location  and  condition  as  near  as  they  could,  and  this  infor- 
mation was  at  once  telegraphed  to  Bamfield  Creek,  a  few  miles 
farther  west.  The  news  of  the  wreck  had  already  been  received  at 
Bamfield  through  the  efforts  of  the  other  part}-  described  hereafter. 

Meantime,  to  return  to  the  events  on  the  T  ^alencia  on  Monday 
night,  it  will  be  remembered  that  two  boats  succeeded  in  getting 
away  within  a  few  moments  after  the  vessel  struck,  but  subse- 
quently capsized,  and  9  of  the  occupants  reached  the  shore  in  safety. 
After  being  thrown  upon  the  rocks  b}-  the  sea,  the  members  of  this 
shore  party  managed  to  crawl  up  out  of  the  reach  of  the  water  and 
spent  the  night  on  the  rocks  at  a  place  probably  not  over  500  yards 
westward  along  the  shore  from  the  Valencia^  but  somewhat  around  a 
little  point.  The  shore  at  this  place  was  so  precipitous  and  rocky 
that  they  did  not  venture  to  attempt  to  ascend  it  in  the  darkness. 

As  soon  as  it  began  to  grow  light  a  way  was  found  up  the  side 
of  the  cliff,  and  the  party,  after  considerable  difficulty,  reached  the 
t(jp  and  there  came  across  the  telegraph  line,  already  mentioned, 
running  from  Cape  Beale  to  Carmanah.  Acting  still  under  the  im- 
pression that  this  was  the  American  shore  and  that  they  were  not 
far  from  Cape  Flattery,  this  party  decided  to  turn  to  the  west  and 
reach  Cape  Flattery,  as  they  supposed,  and  summon  assistance. 

When  this  shore  ]xirt\-  came  to  this  decision  and  turned  to  the 
west  it  nnist  be  said  that  1)v  far  the  best  chance  for  rescuincr  the 
remaining  survivors  on  the  I'alcncia  vanished.  This  party  when  it 
came  to  this  decision  was  not  more  than  half  a  mile,  and  probably 
nnich  less,  from  the  top  of  the  cliff  directK'  back  of  the  stern  of  the 
/  'alciicia.  Tlie  distance  between  the  stern  of  the  Valencia  and  the 
top  of  this  cliff  was  certainly  not  over  250  feet.  As  it  subsequently 
appeared,  it  was  easily  possible  to  fire  a  line  across  this  gap  from  the 


REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX  "VAI.IvNCIA'  DISASTER.  23 

vessel  to  the  top  of  the  cliff.  Had  this  shore  part\-  tlioujj^ht  of  this 
possibilit)-  and  turned  in  llie  other  direction,  toward  tlic  ea.st,  and 
had  come  out  on  the  top  of  the  cliff  back  of  the  J'nlcncia^  they  would 
unquestionably  have  been  there  to  receive  the  line  which,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  was  later  fired  there  from  the  vessel;  they  would  have  had  9 
men  to  pull  ashore  the  line  and  attached  rope  and  to  make  it  fast, 
and  it  is  substantially  certain  that  a  shore  connection  would  thus 
ha\e  been  established,  so  that  b\-  means  of  the  l^reeches  buoy,  which 
was  ready  on  the  Valencia,  all  those  surviving  on  the  wreck  could 
have  been  drawai  ashore  in  safety. 

Almost  incredible  as  it  may  seem,  this  small  space  of  250  feet  made 
the  difference  between  life  and  death  for  the  remaining  100  persons 
on  board  the  /  \ilcncia^  and  this  space  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
bridged  had  there  been  anybod\-  to  take  the  line  on  top  of  the  cliff. 

The  Commission  does  not  desire  to  attribute  blame  to  this  shore 
party  for  its  failure  to  grasp  this  opportunity.  They  had  been  beaten 
through  the  surf,  some  of  them  considerably  injured,  had  spent  the 
night  in  great  discomfort,  without  food  or  shelter,  and  were  none  of 
them  in  a  condition  to  coolly  estimate  the  chances  and  to  consider 
expedients  which  occur  to  persons  in  normal  conditions;  but  inas- 
much as  throughout  the  history  of  this  disaster  blame  has  perhaps 
at  times  been  hastily  imputed  to  various  individuals  and  officials  for 
failure  to  think  of  exactly  the  right  thing  at  the  right  time  this 
unfortunate  oversight  is  also  brought  out,  not  b\-  wa\'  of  criticism, 
but  to  show  the  possibilities  of  perfectly  well  meant  but  mistaken 
action. 

Turning  therefore  to  the  west,  this  shore  party  proceeded  with 
great  difficulty  along  the  telegraph  wire,  finding  no  trail  except  a 
few  infrequent  blazes  on  the  trees,  and  somewhere  about  i  or  2 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  after  crossing  a  difficult  stream — the  Darling 
River — came  to  a  lineman's  hut  on  the  western  bank  of  that  river, 
into  which  the  telegraph  wire  ran,  and  here,  while  in  search  of  food, 
a  telephone  receiver  and  transmitter  was  discovered,  was  connected 
with  the  w'ires,  and  after  repeated  failure  connnnnication  was  estab- 
lished with  the  light-house  keeper  at  Carmanah  a  few  moments 
before  the  arrival  at  Cape  Beale  of  the  N'olunteer  crew  under  McCar- 
thv.  The  information  reaching  Carmanah  was  telegraphed  to  Ram- 
field  Creek,  and  from  there  by  cable  to  Victoria,  thus  giving  to  the 
outside  world  the  first  news  of  the  disaster. 

Meantime,  on  the  Valencia^  and  in  anticipation  of  a  successful 
landing  bv  the  volunteer  crew,  the  Lyle  line-firing  gun  had  been 
placed  in  position  (about  9  o'clock  in  the  morning)  on  the  hurricane 


24  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

deck,  and  attempts  were  made  to  fire  a  line  ashore.  The  first  attempt 
was  nnsnccessful,  inasmuch  as  the  line,  chafing  against  the  side  of 
its  box,  broke,  and  the  projectile  carried  with  it  only  a  few  feet  of 
line,  leaving  the  rest  on  board.  The  second  shot  was  successful, 
and  the  line  was  carried  far  up  over  the  cliff  and  back  into  the 
woods.  This  line  was  a  small  cord,  perhaps  a  quarter  of  an  inch  in 
thickness,  intended  for  drawing  in  a  larger  rope.  The  larger  rope, 
a  new  one  5  inches  in  circumference,  had  been  buckled  to  the 
mainmast  near  the  crosstrees  and  a  pulley  with  a  breeches  buoy 
rigged  on  this  rope,  the  whole  to  be  drawn  ashore  by  means  of  the 
Lyle  gun  line. 

But  for  the  reasons  set  out  above  the  \'olunteer  crew  were  unable 
to  return.  Also  the  other  party,  the  shore  party  of  9,  failed  to 
come  back  to  the  top  of  the  cliff,  and  the  L}'le  gun  line  hung  there 
for  two  or  three  hours,  and  finally,  sagging  into  the  water,  caught 
in  wreckage  and  was  chafed  apart,  and  when  Logan,  Daykin,  and 
Martin,  coming  along  the  telegraph  line  from  Carmanah,  arrived 
near  the  wreck  on  Wednesday,  just  before  it  broke  up,  they  came 
across  the  inner  end  of  this  Lyle  gun  line,  and,  following  it  outward, 
came  out  on  the  brow  of  the  cliff  just  above  the  Valencia  in  time  to 
see  her  finally  go  to  pieces. 

Only  two  lines  were  fired,  it  appearing  that  the  vessel  had  only 
three  projectiles,  and,  furthermore,  it  was  useless  to  fire  another  line 
ashore  unless  there  was  someone  there  to  receive  it. 

Twice  on  Tuesday  courageous  attempts  were  made,  one  by  a 
fireman  and  another  by  one  of  the  ofiicers,  to  swim  ashore  with 
a  line,  but  both  failed,  the  swimmers  being  unable  to  overcome  the 
backwash  of  the  surf,  and  being  greatly  impeded  and  endangered 
b\-  the  wreckage,  which  was  beating  about  between  the  vessel  and 
the  cliffs,  so  that  they  were  both  ultimately  obliged  to  give  up  the 
attempt  and  were  drawn  back  on  board  the  vessel.  Neither  of 
them  got  more  than  halfway  to  the  shore.  Nothing  more  of  impor- 
tance for  this  report  occurred  on  Tuesday  except  the  gradual  break- 
ing up  of  the  upper  w^orks  of  the  Valencia,  so  that  by  Tuesday 
night  the  passengers  were  all  forced  back  to  the  top  of  the  hurricane 
deck,  some  going  into  tlie  rigging.  Most,  how^ever,  remained  on 
top  of  the  hurricane  deck,  where  a  rude  shelter  of  tarpaulins  was 
arranged  for  them,  and  here  all  the  women  were  located,  wdiile  a 
few  of  the  men  staved  down  in  one  of  the  remainino-  cabins  under- 
neath  that  deck  in  the  after-house. 

Tlie  vessel  was  all  the  time  gradually  settling,  her  frames  evidently 
springing  and  a  general  collapse  gradually  taking  place  as  she  worked 


REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALKXCIA"    DISASTER.  25 

on  her  bed  and  was  pounded  1)\  the  waves  throucrh  the  nicrht.  The 
wind  and  rain  continued  at  inter\-als  throuo^hout  the  night  and  the 
next  day.  vShe  la\-  in  about  5  fathoms  at  her  l;ow  and  3'^  at  her 
stern  at  low  tide. 

On  Wednesda>-  morning  the  entire  compau)-  was  forced  to  occup\- 
the  hurricane  deck  or  the  rigging,  as  the  water  was  coming  into  the 
cabins  in  the  after-house  on  the  saloon  deck  and  all  the  rest  of 
the  upper  works  as  far  aft  as  the  after-house,  as  well  as  part  of  the 
after-house,  had  been  broken  awa}-. 

About  half  past  9  Wednesday  morning,  just  as  another  attempt  was 
about  to  be  made  to  swim  ashore  with  a  line,  a  vessel  was  observed 
by  the  passengers  out  to  sea.  This  vessel  was  the  Queen,  ^\'hich 
had  come  down  from  Victoria  to  attempt  to  rescue  the  sur\i\-ors. 
Thereupon  the  attempt  to  swim  the  line  ashore  was  given  up,  and 
after  the  Queen  had  lain  off  some  mile  and  a  half  or  2  miles  away 
for  possibly  a  quarter  or  half  an  hour,  the  two  life  rafts  were 
laimched  in  the  hope  of  reaching  the  Queen.  The  first  raft  had  on 
board  only  10  men,  most  of  the  people  feeling  that  they  would  be 
rescued  directh-  by  the  Queen  and  not  caring  to  take  the  risk  of 
p-oino-  out  on  the  raft.  About  this  time  three  shots  w^ere  also  fired 
from  the  Lyle  gun  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  Queen. 

This  raft  was  launched  and  went  out  without  much  diflficult)- 
through  the  surf,  some  of  the  occupants  rowing,  and  drifted  west  in 
the  current  and  finally  landed  some  time  during  the  night,  apparently 
between  8  o'clock  Wednesday  night  and  i  o'clock  Thursday  morn- 
ing, on  Turret  Island,  about  1 7  miles  west  along  the  coast  from  the 
wreck,  and  when  this  raft  finally  went  ashore  only  4  out  of  the  10 
passengers  were  alive,  2  having  gone  insane  and  jumped  over- 
board and  4  others  having  succumbed  to  exposure.  The  sur\ivors 
were  rescued  the  next  day  by  outside  assistance. 

Immediately  after  the  launching  of  this  first  raft  the  second  raft 
was  launched  and  remained  fastened  alongside  of  the  vessel  for  per- 
haps ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  and  the  unanimous  evidence  of  many 
of  the  survivors  is  that  at  least  2  officers  and  some  of  the  passengers 
urged  the  w^omen  to  go  on  board  this  raft,  telling  them  that  it  was 
their  last  chance.  This,  however,  the  women  all  refused  to  do.  It 
does  appear,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  there  w^as  no  desperate  rush  for 
this  raft,  and  if  a  number  of  witnesses  are  to  be  believed  the  women 
were  given  all  reasonable  opportunity  to  secure  places  on  it.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  at  this  time  the  steamer  Queen  was  in 
plain  sight,  and  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  women,  dreading  the 
chances  of  death  on  this  apparently  frail  raft,  preferred  to  remain 


26  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

on  board,  hoping  to  be  rescued  by  boats  from  the  Queen.  At  all 
events  it  seems  to  the  Commission  highly  probable  that  the  women 
were  not  willfully  deserted,  but  that  they  remained  on  board  of  their 
own  accord  and  against  the  urgings  of  the  officers  of  the  vessel. 

When  this  raft  left  the  side  of  the  vessel  it  carried  its  full  comple- 
ment of  passengers,  i8  men,  and  it  was  crowded  to  about  its  full 
limit.  This  raft  was  subsequenth'  secured  and  brought  to  Seattle, 
and  the  Commission  made  a  test  of  it;  and  while  the  Commission 
managed  to  oret  22  men  on  it,  it  was  obvious  that  18  would  crowd 
it  seriously.  This  raft  went  out  through  the  breakers  without 
much  difficulty,  four  oars  being  used  and  also  bits  of  wreckage 
for  paddles;  and  while  most  of  the  occupants  were  to  some  extent 
in  the  water  as  it  washed  over  the  raft,  they  were  nevertheless  able 
to  row  after  a  fashion,  and  none  of  them  was  at  any  time  washed 
off,  and  the  experience  of  this  raft  and  its  passengers  is  one  of  the 
strongest  e\-idences  that  the  sea  about  this  time,  to  wit,  half  past  9 
or  10  o'clock  Wednesday  morning,  was  not  severe.     . 

It  is  inconceivable  that  a  raft  so  heavily  loaded,  mostly  with 
landsmen  and  using  oars  necessarily  so  close  to  the  water  as  is  the 
case  with  a  raft,  should  have  been  able  to  proceed  without  accident 
and  without  serious  trouble  through  any  formidable  line  of  break- 
ers; and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  other  witnesses  who  testified  to  the 
severity  of  the  sea  on  that  da)^  recognized,  and,  in  some  cases, 
expressly  said  that  this  instance  of  the  coming  out  of  these  rafts 
was  a  puzzle  to  them  and  wholly  unintelligible. 

The  Queen  at  no  time  saw  either  of  these  rafts.  The  second  raft 
was  picked  up  by  the  Topeka. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THIRD   PERIOD— RESCUE  FROM   OUTSIDE. 

Between  3.15  and  3.30  Tuesday  afternoon,  January  23,  a  telephone 
message  was  received  at  the  Seattle  office  of  the  owners,  the  Pacific 
Coast  Steamship  Company,  l^y  Mr.  J.  E.  Pharo,  assistant  to  the 
manager  of  the  company,  which  message  came  from  Victoria,  B.  C, 
and  stated  that  a  vessel  had  gone  a.shore  somewhere  on  the  west 
coast  of  Vancouver  Island.  About  five  minutes  later  this  information 
was  supplemented  by  a  further  message  stating  that  the  vessel  was 
the  Valettcia^  and  that  she  was  ashore  somewhere  west  of  Carmanah 
Light.  Captain  James  B.  Patterson,  port  captain  of  the  company  at 
Seattle,  was  also  in  the  office  when  this  message  was  received,  and 
assisted  ]\Ir.  Pharo  in  his  preparations  for  rescue. 

Knowing  that  the  Queen,  one  of  the  large  passenger  steamers  of  the 
same  company,  was  shortly  due  at  \'ictoria,  orders  were  sent  at  once 
to  Captain  Cousins,  in  charge  of  this  vessel,  to  land  his  passengers  at 
Victoria  and  proceed  at  once  to  the  scene  of  the  wreck  and  do  what- 
ever he  could  in  the  way  of  rescue. 

Mr.  Pharo  then  attempted  to  secure  the  services  of  one  or  more 
seagoing  tugs,  knowing  that  a  light-draft,  easily  handled  vessel 
would  be  the  most  serviceable  in  the  work  of  rescue  from  a  steamer 
ashore.  But  no  seagoing  tug  was,  at  the  time,  available  in  Seattle 
or  at  points  sufficiently  near  to  be  of  an>-  use,  except  one  vessel 
which  was  under  repairs  and  could  not  be  made  ready.  The  Puget 
Sound  Towboat  Compau}-,  which  operates  most  of  the  seagoing  tugs 
in  this  vicinit)-,  informed  :\Ir.  Pharo  that  they  undoubtedly  had 
tugs  lying  in  Neah  Ba\-,  which  is  within  5  miles  of  Cape  Flattery 
and  about  25  miles  from  the  place  of  the  wreck.  There  are  tugs  King 
in  this  bay  almost  continuoush',  waiting  to  tow  incoming  vessels  up 
the  Straits.  But  it  then  appeared  that  the  Government  telegraph  line 
from  Neah  Bay  to  Port  Angeles,  communicating  from  there  with 
Seattle,  was  out  of  order  and  no  communication  could  be  had  with 
Neah  Ba^-,  although,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  seems  almost  certain  that 
there  were  at  least  one  and  possibly  two  seagoing  tugs  h'ing  in  the 
vicinity  of  Neah  Bay,  within  25  miles  of  the  wreck,  during  much  of 

27 


28  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

the  time  when  the  rescue  operations  were  going-  on.  This  failure  of 
communication  was  one  of  the  very  unfortunate  incidents  that  mini- 
mized the  chances  of  rescue. 

The  Topeka^  another  vessel  belonging  to  the  Pacific  Coast  Steam- 
ship Company,  was  also  at  this  time  lying  in  Seattle  Harbor  dis- 
charging a  cargo  of  dynamite.  As  soon  as  news  came  of  the  wreck 
Mr.  Pharo  also  ordered  the  discharging  of  this  cargo  to  be  rushed, 
and  finding  shortly  thereafter  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  all 
of  the  dynamite  out  before  late  at  night,  he  ordered  the  captain  to 
prepare  and  proceed  to  the  scene  of  the  wreck  without  unloading 
all  the  cargo,  and  she  left  for  the  wreck  about  lo  p.  m.  Tuesday 
night.  Mr.  Pharo  and  Captain  Patterson  went  with  her  and  they 
took  along  nurses,  a  doctor,  various  medical  stores,  and  17  extra 
seamen. 

Meantime  Captain  Cousins,  on  the  Qiieen^  pursuant  to  his  orders 
at  Victoria,  landed  his  passengers  there,  except  about  12,  and  at 
5  o'clock  Tuesday  afternoon  started  for  the  scene  of  the  wreck,  and 
arrived  off  Carmanah  Light  about  10  o'clock  that  night.  His 
information  when  he  started  from  Victoria  was  that  the  wreck  was 
4  miles  west  of  Carmanah  Light.  Arriving  at  the  light,  he  prac- 
tically laid  to,  drifting  or  cruising  up  and  down  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Straits  until  da}'light  next  morning  and  then  proceeded  westward 
along  the  shores  of  Vancouver  Island,  speaking  Carmanah  Light  on 
the  way  and  beings  informed  that  the  wreck  was  18  miles  west  of 
Carmanah.  He  also  passed  the  Canadian  vessels  Csar  and  Salvor 
near  Carmanah  Light.  Keeping  a  course  within  a  mile  or  two  of 
the  shore,  he  observed  the  wreck  about  half  past  9  in  the  morning, 
Wednesday,  and  laid  to  at  that  point,  about  a  mile  or  mile  and  a 
half  from  the  shore.  Shortl)-  after  he  arrived  there  he  observed  the 
Czar  following  him  from  the  eastward  and  steamed  out  about  a 
mile  to  stop  this  vessel,  which  was  going  past  under  the  impression 
received  from  Carmanah  Light  that  the  I'alencia  was  much  farther 
to  the  westward. 

The  Czar  is  a  small  ocean-goino  tug  of  the  usual  t)pe,  of  Cana- 
dian registr\ ,  and  was  apparently  at  the  time  of  the  wreck  proceed- 
ing westward  up  the  coast  of  Vancouver  on  a  towage  job  in  the 
vicinit)-  of  Barclay  Sound.  Upon  being  informed  of  the  position 
of  the  wreck,  the  Czar  steamed  in  toward  it  to  a  distance  of  from 
three-cjuarters  of  a  mile  to  a  mile  from  the  shore,  the  evidence  on 
this  point  being  quite  conflicting.  Apparently  the  Czar  did  not 
stop  off  the  wreck  when  it  reached  the  nearest  point  to  it,  iMit  made 


REPORT    OK    COMMISSION    OX  "  VAI.KN'CIA''  DISASTKR.  29 

a  turn  and  came  back  ao;ain  at  once ;  and  there  is  some  evidence 
that  about  the  time  the  Czar  made  the  turn  she  shi])ped  consider- 
able water  an^l  her  master  was  alarmed  thereb>-.  :Meantime,  the 
Salvor,  a  wreckino^  vessel  of  Canadian  registry,  had  also  come  up 
alongside  of  the  Queen,  and  when  the  Csar  came  out  from  her  trip 
toward  the  w  reck  she  first  spoke  the  Salvor  and  then  came  over  to 
the  Queen. 

Prior  to  the  arrival  of  the  Czar  on  the  scene,  the  men  on  the 
Queen  had  observed  evidences  of  life  on  the  wreck.  Three  i)uffs  of 
smoke  were  noted  from  the  afterhouse  of  the  wreck,  and  with  the 
glasses  objects  were  observed  in  her  rigging  and  apparently  blankets 
flving  from  her  shrouds.  Accordingly,  when  the  Czar  came  out 
and  spoke  the  Queen  after  her  run  in  toward  the  wreck,  Captain 
Cousins  and  others'  on  the  Queen  told  the  Czar  that  there  was  life 
on  the  wreck.  Captain  Cousins  says  that  he  is  not  positive  that 
the  master  of  the  6>«/' heard  him,  inasmuch  as  he  (Captain  Cousins) 
was  talking  with  a  megaphone,  but  the  master  of  the  Czar  did  not 
have  one.  There  is  a  distinct  contradiction  of  evidence  between 
witnesses  on  the  Queen  and  witnesses  on  the  Czar,  the  latter  of 
whom  state  that  they  were  not  informed  that  there  was  life  on  the 
wreck,  and  they  also  affirm  that  they  themselves  saw  no  life  on  the 
wreck,  that  they  so  stated  to  the  captain  of  the  Queen,  and  that 
they  acted  on  this  belief. 

At  all  events,  the  Czar  then  terminated  the  conversation  by 
informing  the  Queen  that  the  Czar  and  Salvor  were  going  up  the 
coast  w^estward,  and  both  at  once  proceeded  to  do  so,  leaving  the  scene 
of  the  wreck  about  10.15  a.  m.  The  intention  of  the  masters  of 
these  boats,  the  Czar  and  Salvor,  was  to  go  to  Bam  field  and  there 
organize  a  land  party  to  give  what  assistance  was  possible  by  way 
of  a  land  trail. 

Shortly  after  the  departure  of  the  Czar  and  Salvor  the  haze  and 
rain,  which  had  been  intermittent  up  to  this  time,  increased,  so  that 
from  that  time  on  the  Queen  did  not  have  any  sight  of  the  wreck,  as 
she  lay  2  or  3  miles  off  from  it.  During  this  entire  period,  while 
the  Queen  was  lying  off  the  wreck,  she  made  no  attempt  at  rescue 
and  did  not  lower  her  boats  or  rafts.  Captain  Cousins  called  in  con- 
sultation with  him  shortly  after  his  arrival  off  the  wreck  five  Cana- 
dian and  American  pilots,  whom  he  had  taken  on  board  at  Victoria, 
and  they  all  concurred  with  him  in  the  belief,  first,  that  the  Queen 
had  previously  gone  as  far  inshore  as  was  safe  for  her  to  go,  con- 
sidering- the  unknown   nature  of  the  bottom.     The  Queen  drew  21 


30  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

feet  of  water  at  the  time  and  was  about  300  feet  long-,  being  one  of 
the  largest  vessels  of  the  Pacific  Coast  Steamship  Company's  fleet. 
Secondly,  this  conference  agreed  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  attempt 
to  send  lifeboats  in  to  the  ]'alencia,  as  they  believed  such  boats 
could  not  be  gotten  out  again  against  the  surf  and  wind,  and  that 
anv  such  attempt  would  mereh-  mean  a  further  loss  of  life. 

At  this  point  it  is  only  justice  to  Captain  Cousins  to  say  that  the 
Commission  denies  emphatically  the  truth  of  a  certain  rumor  which 
prevailed  shortly  after  the  wreck  and  which  was  given  wide  cur- 
rency in  the  public  press,  to  the  effect  that  a  half  dozen  seamen  of 
the  United  States  Navy,  who  were  on  board  the  Queeu^  came  to 
Captain  Cousins  and  volunteered  to  take  a  lifeboat  to  the  wreck  and 
that  Captain  Cousins  refused  to  allow  them  to  do  so.  Three  of  this 
half  dozen  of  seamen  were  brought  up  from  San  Francisco  and 
placed  on  the  stand  b>'  the  Commission,  and  they  all  denied  making 
any  such  offer,  and  said  that  no  such  offer  had  been  made.  This 
rumor  evidently  arose  from  a  mistaken  understanding  of  the  con- 
versation between  passengers  and  has  been  the  source  of  much 
unjust  criticism  of  Captain  Cousins.  The  Commission  is  thoroughly 
convinced  that  no  such  offer  ever  took  place. 

Meantime  the  Topeka^  having  left  Seattle  about  10  o'clock  the 
previous  night,  as  already  described,  came  directly  down  the  Straits 
and  arrived  alongside  of  the  Queen  about  11  o'clock  Wednesday 
morning.  The  Topcka  was  in  command  of  Captain  Cann,  and,  as 
above  stated,  had  also  on  board  Mr.  Pharo,  the  assistant  to  the  man- 
ager of  the  compan\-.  Captain  James  B.  Patterson,  port  captain  of  the 
compan\-  at  Seattle,  and  also  two  marine  insurance  men.  The 
QtLeen  informed  tlie  Topeka  that  the  wreck  was  directly  astern  of 
the  Qtieen^  which  was  at  that  time  lying  bow  out  to  sea.  She  also 
informed  the  Topeka  that  there  was  life  on  board,  and  that  they  had 
seen  three  puffs  of  smoke.  Mr.  Pharo  then  ordered  the  Queeti  to 
return  to  Victoria,  take  on  board  her  passengers,  and  proceed  on  her 
trip  toward  vSan  PVancisco,  speaking  the  Topeka  again  on  her  way 
out.  Without  comment  or  protest,  Captain  Cousins  obeyed  this 
order  and  proceeded  to  yictoria,  leaving  the  Topeka  off  the  wreck. 

The  Queen  did  not  give,  nor  did  the  Topeka  ask  for,  any  compass 
bearings  as  to  the  location  of  the  wreck,  and  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  the  Qiiecu^  on  account  of  the  haze  and  thick  weather, 
had  not  seen  the  wreck  for  nearly  an  hour  prior  to  the  arrival  of  the 
Topeka^  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Topeka  did  not  at  any  time 
catch  sight  ol  the  wreck  during  the  rest  of  that  day  or  while  there 
were  anv  survivors  on  board  it. 


REPORT    OF    COMMISSION'    OX   "  \AI,KN'CIA"  DISASTER.  31 

Upon  the  departure  of  the  Queen  the  Topeka  steamed  in  slowly, 
abont  a  mile,  till  within  sight  of  the  coast,  and  there  obtained  sonnd- 
ings  of  abont  11  fathoms;  and  deeming  it  nnwise  to  go  nearer  to 
the  coast  she  proceeded  to  patrol  the  coast  np  and  down  in  search 
of  the  wreck,  going,  apparenth',  nearly  as  far  northwest  as  Cape 
Beale  and  as  far  sontheast  as  the  wreck,  bnt  at  no  time  catchinof 
sight  of  it. 

At  abont  noon,  while  on  her  westward  beat,  she  sighted  one  of 
the  two  rafts  which  had  left  the  \  'a/encia,  being  the  second  raft  to 
lea\e  and  having  on  board  18  people.  This  raft  when  sighted  was 
substantially  northward  of  the  Topeka  and  probably  abont  4  miles 
west  of  the  wreck.  When  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  raft 
the  Topeka  lowered  a  boat  which  towed  the  raft  alongside  the 
steamer,  and  the  survivors  were  taken  on  board.  Considerable  con- 
flict of  testimou}-  exists  as  to  whether  these  survivors  were  ques- 
tioned thoroughly  as  to  the  location  of  the  wreck  and  the  condition 
of  it.  They  were  naturally  in  a  ver>-  much  weakened  condition 
themselves  and  what  information  the\'  could  give  was  necessarih' 
unsatisfactor}-,  as  they  themselves  had  not  seen  the  wreck  for  several 
hours,  but  it  does  not  appear  that  the\-  were  interrogated  with  the 
thoroughness  that  should  ha\'e  been  exercised,  and  man\-  of  them 
were  not  questioned  at  all. 

The  Topeka  then  continued  her  patrol  up  and  down  the  coast  till 
about  4  o'clock  that  afternoon,  and  as  it  became  dark  desisted  from 
the  work  and  went  over  and  spent  the  night  near  Neah  Bay.  The 
Topeka  at  no  time  lowered  any  of  her  boats  or  rafts,  except  on  the 
one  occasion  when  she  picked  np  the  life  raft  from  the  I'aleneia.  It 
seems  probable  that  the  Topeka  never  got  very  close  to  the  wreck  at 
any  time  Wednesda}-.  When  the  Queen  gave  the  first  information 
to  the  Topeka  that  the  wreck  was  directly  astern  of  the  Queen ^  the 
Queen  at  that  time  had  not  seen  the  wreck  for  nearly  an  hour  and  had 
been  lying  offshore  in  a  current  which  runs  westward  at  this  point 
probably  from  2  to  3  miles  an  hour,  and  therefore,  while  the  wreck  had 
probabh-  been  directly  astern  of  the  Queen  when  it  was  last  seen,  the 
drift  of  this  current  had  been  such  that  when  the  Topeka  arrived 
the  Queen  was  probabh-  between  i  and  2  miles  westward  of  the 
wreck  on  the  coast.  Captain  Cann,  of  the  Topeka^  admits  he 
"missed  it  (the  wreck)  about  a  mile"  when  he  went  toward  shore 
immediately  after  the  Queen  left.  This  current  here  is  well  known 
to  mariners,  but  neither  the  master  of  the  Queen  nor  of  the  Topeka 
made  an  allowance  for  this  drift. 


32  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "'VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

Meantime,  the  wreck  had  broken  up  completely  as  to  its  upper 
works  somewhere  between  12  and  i  o'clock  Wednesday  afternoon. 
Mr.  Daykin,  assistant  light-house  keeper  at  Carmanah,  and  IVIr. 
Logan,  lineman,  who  had  been  at  Carmanah  Light  when  the  news  of 
the  wreck  had  been  received  there  from  the  shore  party  on  Tues- 
day afternoon,  left  at  once  in  company  with  Martin,  a  trapper,  to  go 
to  the  wreck,  but  finding  the  Clanewah  River  too  high  to  be  passable 
they  spent  Tuesday  night  there,  some  2  or  3  miles  east  of  the  wreck, 
and  proceeded  again  Wednesday  morning  along  the  line  of  the  tele- 
graph wire.  While  passing  on  this  line  back  of  the  bluffs  overlook- 
ing the  wreck  they  found  the  broken  Lyle  gun  line  which  had  been 
fired  from  the  J^'alencia  lying  across  the  trail,  and  following  this  line 
outward  came  out  on  the  bluff  over  the  wreck  just  in  time  to  observe 
its  final  condition,  and  very  shortly  after  their  arrival  the  last  of  the 
upper  works  collapsed  and  all  the  survivors  thereon,  from  60  to  80 
persons,  except  a  few  who  clung  to  the  rigging,  were  swept  into  the 
water  and  perished,  some  of  them  being  drowned  and  some  being 
beaten  to  death  against  the  rocks. 

All  of  these  persons  had  on  life-preservers,  and  quite  a  number  were 
carried  out  to  sea  through  the  breakers  and  perished  there.  It  is  not 
probable  that  many  survived  long  in  the  water  when  we  consider 
their  state  of  exhaustion  following  the  thirty-six  hours'  exposure  on 
the  wreck  and  lack  of  food  and  water.  Messrs.  Logan,  Daykin,  and 
Martin  were  wholh-  unable  to  aid  in  any  way,  as  the  wreck  was 
inaccessible  from  the  shore  and  the)-  could  not  throw  a  line  to  her, 
and  when  the  final  catastrophe  occurred  they  were  so  overcome 
with  the  horror  of  the  sight  that  they  left  the  spot  at  once  and  pro- 
ceeded along  the  trail  to  the  Darling  River,  where,  late  Wednesday 
afternoon,  they  found  the  shore  party  of  9  in  the  lineman's  hut. 

Subsequently  Messrs.  Logan  and  Daykin,  with  the  assistance  of 
Mr.  Martin,  Mr.  Bunker,  and  others,  rendered  valuable  assistance  in 
recovering  the  bodies  of  the  victims. 


CIIAPTRR    VI. 

CONDITIONS    OF    TIDE    AND    WEATHER. 

On  the  night  of  Monda)-,  January  22,  high  tide  occnrred  at  the 
point  wliere  the  J^alcncia  went  ashore  at  practically  midnight.  The 
rise  and  fall  of  the  tide  dnring  the  next  two  days  was  about  8  feet. 
It  appears  clear  that  when  the  /  'alciicia  went  ashore  there  was  a 
strong  southeast  breeze,  blowing  15  to  25  miles  an  hour;  that  this 
continued  throughout  the  night,  and  that  there  was  also  a  fairly 
heavy  swell  coming  in  from  the  ocean.  Apparently  Tuesday  morn- 
ing, and  possibly  part  of  Tuesday  afternoon,  the  weather  was  less 
wind>-  and  the  sea  calmer  than  at  any  other  time  before  the  final 
break-up  of  the  wreck.  Showers  and  hazy  weather  were  character- 
istic of  the  entire  period. 

The  reports  froui  Cape  Flattery  for  this  period  as  to  the  wind  and 
weather  are  not  at  all  definite,  except  on  the  point  that  during  the 
entire  night  of  January  22,  until  about  4  o'clock  January  23,  there 
was  no  fog  or  haze  visible  from  Cape  Flattery  Light,  and  that 
Carmanah  light  was  clearly  visible  from  the  Flattery  Light  during 
the  entire  night  of  the  wreck  and  until  dawn  of  the  next  morning. 
Also  that  the  fog  signal  w^as  stopped  at  4  p.  m.  Monday  and  not 
started  till  4.30  a.  m.  Tuesday.  The  log  of  Carmanah  Light,  12 
miles  from  the  wreck,  shows  that  on  the  morning  of  Monday  and 
until  3.45  p.  m.  it  was  rainy  and  hazy  and  the  fog  signal  blowing, 
but  was  stopped  at  3.45  p.  m.;  that  there  was  a  fresh  easterly  wind, 
growing  stronger  on  Monday  night,  and  that  the  entry  at  1  a.  m. 
Tuesday  morning  is  "strong  easterly  gale;"  that  it  became  hazy  at  7 
a.  m.  Tuesday,  and  the  fog  signal  was  started  at  8 ;  that  there  was  also 
a  strong  easterly  wind  Tuesday  night  and  Wednesday  morning ;  9.15 
a.  m.  Wednesday  morning  a  fresh  easterly  wind,  cloudy  and  drizzle, 
and  3  p.  m.  Wednesday  strong  easterly  wind,  increasing  toward 
night ;  that  during  the  night  of  the  wreck  Flattery  light  was  \'isible 
all  night,  thus  corroborating  the  statement  from  Flatter)-  that  Car- 
manah light  was  visible  there  all  night. 

As  bearing  on  the  recommendations  of  the  Commission  and  the 
peculiar  conditions  of  this  entrance  to  the  Straits,  one  most  important 
fact  must  be  emphasized  here,  to  wit,  that  during  the  entire  night 
25639—06 3  33 


34  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

when  the  Valencia  went  ashore,  on  which  night  she  saw  no  lights  and 
when  the  most  distant  view  she  got  at  any  time  was  possibh-  2  miles, 
having  been  in  a  bank  of  fog  or  haze  continuonsh',  it  was  neverthe- 
less apparently  qnite  clear  in  the  neighborhood  of  these  two  nearest 
lights,  so  mnch  so  that  neither  operated  its  fog  signal  after  4  o'clock 
Monday  afternoon,  or  nntil  after  dawn  the  next  morning,  and  so  far 
as  could  be  told  from  these  two  lights  there  was  no  haze  or  fog  that 
required  the  operation  of  the  signals.  This  supports  strongh'  the 
recommendations  of  the  Commission,  hereinafter  set  forth,  as  to 
the  need  of  a  light-ship  on  Forty  Fathom  Bank  off  the  entrance  to 
the  Straits. 

The  condition  of  the  sea  from  half  past  9  a.  m.  till  i  p.  m.  Wednes- 
da)'  the  24th,  covering  the  time  when  the  rescue  fleet  was  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  wreck  and  until  it  broke  up,  is  of  especial  importance 
as  bearing  upon  the  possibilities  of  rescue,  and  there  is  a  correspond- 
ino-  amount  of  conflicting  testimonv  thereon,  directed  mainly  to  the 
point  whether  it  would  have  been  reasonably  possible  to  get  a  life- 
boat, such  as  the  Queen  or  the  Topcka  carried,  in  to  the  wreck  and 
out  again,  or  to  have  approached  more  closely  to  the  wreck  with  the 
Queen,  or  to  have  floated  life  rafts  to  the  wreck  under  the  tow  of 
lifeboats,  or  to  have  gone  sufficienth-  close  to  the  wreck  with  life- 
boats to  get  a  line  to  it. 

On  the  one  hand  we  have  the  testimou)-  of  men  on  the  Topeka, 
Czar,  and  Salvor,  and  especialh'  on  the  Queen,  all  of  whom  were 
of  the  opinion  apparently  that  a  rescue  was  not  possible.  On 
board  the  Qneen  were  Captain  Cousins,  her  master,  a  man  with 
an  exceptionally  good  record  for  courage  and  efficiency,  and  practi- 
cally the  senior  captain  of  the  company's  fleet,  as  well  as  five  other 
experienced  masters  and  pilots  familiar  with  these  waters,  all  of 
whom  expressed  their  opinion  at  the  time,  and  reiterated  it  before 
the  Commission,  that  the  sending  of  a  lifeboat  from  the  Queen  in  to 
the  wreck  on  Wednesday  morning  would  have  meant  the  probable 
loss  of  the  crew  of  the  boat  without  any  corresponding  chance  of 
success.  Neither  the  master  of  the  Czar  nor  the  Salvor  appeared 
before  the  Commission,  but  from  their  conduct  their  opinion  must 
have  been  the  same. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  evidence,  first,  of  the  survivors 
from  the  Valencia  who  were  on  that  vessel  when  the  rescue  fleet 
was  in  sight ;  the  evidence  of  Messrs.  Logan  and  Daykin ;  the  evi- 
dence of  certain  excellent  photographs  which  were  taken  by  Mr. 
Curtis,  the  photographer  on  the  staff  of  the  Seattle  Post-Intelligencer, 


REPORT   OF   COMMISSION    OX  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER.  35 

from  the  deck  of  the  Topcka  011  Wednesday,  and  wliich  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  Commission  as  exhibits;  and  finalh-  the  experience 
of  the  vohmtcer  crew  which  went  ont  Tuesday  morning,  a  day  before 
the  period  now  in  question,  and  the  experiences  of  the  two  life  rafts 
which  left  the  Valencia  while  the  Qiicctt  was  in  sight  offshore  on 
Wednesday  morning. 

Low  water  occurred  at  6.22  a.  m.  Wednesday,  and  the  next  high 
water  thereafter  at  12. 11  p.  ni.  Wednesday,  a  rise  of  8  feet.  The 
evidence  of  the  observers  on  board  the  wreck  is  to  the  effect  that 
there  was  substantialh-  a  continuous  line  of  breakers  in  front  of  the 
Valencia^  at  right  angles  to  her  length,  and  various  witnesses  placed 
this  line  either  at  her  bow  or  at  varying  distances,  as  far  as  200 
yards  out.  The  waves  were  sweeping  oxer  most  of  the  vessel 
except  a  small  portion  of  the  hurricane  deck  on  the  after-house,  per- 
haps 20  or  30  feet  in  length,  where  the  survivors  were  gathered. 
The  vessel  was  lying  on  a  comparatively  even  keel.  Messrs.  Logan 
and  Daykin,  who  stood  directh'  back  of  the  vessel  on  the  cliff,  testi- 
fied that  this  line  of  breakers  ran  along  about  100  vards  outside 
the  bow  of  the  Valencia^  but  that  for  a  space  of  possibh'  200  or  300 
feet  directly  in  front  of  the  l^alenda  there  was  an  interval  of 
smoother  water,  which,  if  true,  may  explain  some  otherwise  puzzling 
facts.  It  is  possible  that  oil  floating  out  from  the  sunken  vessel 
ma\'  have  caused  this  smooth  water. 

The  volunteer  crew  went  out  Tuesday  morning  with  comparative 
ease,  but  it  is  agreed  that  the  sea  on  this  day  was  smoother  than  on 
Wednesday.  The  most  convincing  testimony,  however,  as  to  the 
comparative  smoothness  of  the  sea,  lies  in  the  experience  of  the  two 
life  rafts  that  left  the  wreck  while  the  Queen  was  in  sight  and 
within  half  an  hour  of  each  other.  The  first  of  these  rafts  went  off 
with  10  men  on  board,  and,  with  some  of  them  rowing,  got  out 
beyond  the  line  of  breakers  without  losing  anyone;  was  drifted 
westward  down  the  current  in  the  trough  of  the  sea  for  at  least  1 7 
miles,  and  from  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  till  sometime  in  the 
nipfht  when  she  went  ashore  carried  the  senseless  or  dead  bodies  of 
4  of  her  passengers  without  an)-  of  them  being  washed  off,  and  the 
survivors  of  this  raft  testified  that  tlie>-  were  at  no  time  in  any  great 
danger  of  being  washed  off,  even  while  going  through  the  breakers, 
and  that  once  outside  the  line  of  breakers  they  rode  with  entire 
safety. 

The  second  raft,  which  went  out  within  half  an  hour  of  the  first, 
lav  alongside  the  vessel  at  the  stern  for  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  moored 


36  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

by  a  painter,  rising  and  falling  alongside,  but  apparent!}-  not  collid- 
ing severely  with  lier.  Eighteen  passengers,  the  fnll  complement 
for  this  raft,  got  on  board,  some  of  them  sitting  and  kneeling, 
and  one,  at  least,  standing  np  on  her  stern.  When  this  raft  was 
cut  loose,  four  oars  were  gotten  out,  and  other  passengers  provided 
themselves  with  paddles  in  the  shape  of  bits  of  board,  and  with 
these  means  the  raft  was  forced  out  through  the  surf  and  at  least 
half  to  three-quarters  of  a  mile  beyond  it  without  losing  any  passen- 
gers or  oars.  The  use  of  an  oar  on  a  raft  which  lies  so  close  to  the 
water  is,  as  a  general  proposition,  a  difficult  task,  and  it  is  very  hard 
to  see  how  unskilled  men  under  such  conditions  could  manage  to 
row  through  anv  surf  which  could  be  considered  at  all  heavy. 

With  only  one  or  two  exceptions  the  passengers  on  the  raft  testi- 
fied that  they  at  no  time  felt  any  danger  of  being  washed  off  and 
that  no  hea^•^■  seas  came  over  them  e\'en  while  in  the  surf,  and 
when  these  facts  were  outlined  to  the  witnesses  on  the  Queen^  and 
especially  to  the  experienced  seamen  who  testified  to  a  line  of  heavy 
breakers,  they  admitted  themselves  wholly  unable  to  explain  them, 
and  said  frankly  that  the  experience  of  these  rafts  was  a  puzzle  to 
them.  Referring  to  the  testimony  of  Messrs.  Logan  and  Daykin, 
as  to  the  narrow  strip  of  comparatively  smooth  water  directly  in 
front  of  the  Valencia^  there  ma}'  be  here  a  partial  explanation  for 
this  difficulty,  and  it  is  possible  that  these  rafts  went  out  through 
this  smooth  strip  while  the  rescue  fleet,  which  did  not  lie  directly 
out  from  the  J^alencia^  and  therefore  got  only  a  diagonal  view  of 
her  bow,  did  not  observe  this  gap  in  the  breakers.  The  water  at 
the  bow  of  the  Valencia  was  about  5  fathoms  in  depth  at  low  water, 
deepening  gradually  to  seaward,  and,  with  the  swell  that  doubtless 
prevailed  at  the  time  of  the  wreck,  it  might  easily  be  that  the  sea 
would  break  at  this  point,  if  not  farther  out. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

EQUIPMENT   OF   THE   VALENCIA. 

During  the  \ear  preceding  the  disaster  the  Valencia's  equipment 
had  been  inspected  three  times,  the  hist  time  three  weeks  before  the 
wreck.  So  far  as  it  appears  from  the  testimony,  her  equipment  was 
in  excellent  condition  and  completely  fulfilled  the  requirements  of 
the  law  and  regulations,  with  certain  very  minor  exceptions.  She 
carried  more  life-preservers  than  was  required  and  a  larger  boat 
capacity.  Her  engines  and  machinery  were  in  good  condition  and 
her  hull  had  recently  been  o\'erhauled  and  repaired.  There  was 
some  evidence  to  show  that  one  of  the  thole  pins  in  one  of  the  boats 
did  not  fit,  but  this  might  have  been  due  to  inexperience  of  the 
person  using  it.  There  was  also  some  evidence  to  the  effect  that 
one  of  the  plugs  in  one  of  the  boats  was  missing. 

Complaints  were  made  by  some  of  the  survivors  as  to  the  buoyant 
quality  of  the  tule  life-preservers.  This  fact  is  a  matter  which  can 
not  be  charged  against  the  owners  of  the  vessel,  inasmuch  as  such 
life-preservers  were  allowed  by  law  and  had  been  properh'  passed 
by  the  inspector.  One  or  two  witnesses  stated  that  these  life- 
preservers  seemed  to  weigh  50  to  60  pounds  when  they  got  out  of  the 
water  with  them  on,  but  these  men  were  in  an  exhausted  condition, 
and  such  estimates  are,  of  course,  incorrect,  inasmuch  as  the  cubic 
capacity  of  an  ordinary  life-preserver,  if  filled  entirely  with  water, 
would  not  weigh  over  40  pounds. 

A  public  test  was  made  by  the  Commission  at  Seattle  of  eight  tule 
life-preservers,  taken  off  as  man}-  different  steamers  in  the  harbor, 
with  the  result  that  the)-  all  sustained  the  test,  and  after  an  immer- 
sion of  17  hours  in  salt  water,  with  20  pounds  attached  to  each, 
were  all  afloat,  and  the  heaviest  of  them  at  the  end  of  that  time 
weighed  14  pounds,  having  absorbed  9  pounds  15  ounces  of  water. 

Other  tests  were  made  at  one  of  the  factories  where  these  life- 
preservers  are  made  in  San  Francisco,  where  such  life-preser\'ers 
sustained  a  weight  of  34  pounds  for  a  short  period. 

These  tests  will  be  continued  by  the  Department  and  the  results 
laid  before  the  Board  of  Supervising  Inspectors,  Steamboat-Inspection 
Service,  which  has  jurisdiction  over  the  subject. 

37 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

In  accordance  with  the  facts  set  forth  in  the  foregoing  narrative, 
which  contains,  it  is  believed,  substantially  all  the  essential  points 
broug-ht  out  in  the  testimonv,  the  Commission  desires  to  state  certain 
general  conclusions  bearing  on  the  responsibility  for  the  loss  of  life 
in  this  disaster : 

(i)  The  laleitcia  went  ashore  through  the  faulty  navigation  of 
Captain  Johnson,  her  master. 

He  appears  to  have  been  a  man  of  good  character,  sober,  and  with 
a  good  reputation  as  a  seaman,  but  his  management  of  the  vessel  on 
this  trip  was  unsatisfactory  on  several  points,  as  follows : 

{a)  He  acted  upon  the  singular  belief  that  his  log  was  "  overrun- 
ning 6  per  cent,"  a  belief  that  would  have  been  justified  only  upon 
the  ground  that  both  the  current  and  the  wind  were  against  him, 
whereas  the  wind  w^as  certainh'  nearly  aft,  and  it  is  common  knowl- 
edp-e  among  all  masters  along  this  coast  that  at  this  time  of  year 
the  normal  current  flows  toward  the  northward  and  accordingly 
with  the  course  of  the  vessel,  both  of  which  facts  would  make  the 
vessel  go  faster  over  the  ground  than  through  the  water,  and  the 
log  would  therefore  fail  to  register  the  entire  progress  of  the  vessel 
over  the  ground,  and  thus  the  log  would  jiudcrruu,  if  anything, 
rather  than  overrun. 

{b)  Although  he  saw  no  land  or  lights  with  certainty  after  pass- 
ing Cape  Mendocino  at  5.30  a.  m.  Sunday,  he  did  not  commence  to 
take  soundings  until  6  p.  m.  Monday,  thirty-six  hours  later,  when 
his  last  definite  point  of  departure  was  at  least  450  miles  behind  him. 

{c)  Even  after  he  began  to  take  somidings,  he  did  not  take  them 
with  sufficient  frequency.  He  did  not  interpret  correctly  the  sound- 
ings taken,  and,  .so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  he  spent  very  little  time 
in  comparing  tlie  soundings  witli  his  chart  and  did  not  carefully 
study  them,  as  he  should. 

{(i)  Such  soundings  as  he  got  might  not  have  shown  him  where 
he   was,  but  if  j^roperly  studied   they  would  at  least  have  demon- 
strated the  fact  that  he  was  not  where  he  thought  he  was  and  that 
he  should  be  on  his  guard.      It  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  bottom  along 
38 


RKPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX  ''VALENCIA"  DISASTER.  39 

this  course  that  if  a  vessel  is  proceedinjr  as  she  should  when 
approachino;  Umatilla  Licrht-shi]-)  from  the  south  and  from  there 
up  to  Cape  Flattery,  she  will  ^ct  a  definite  line  of  soundinj^s  of  no 
great  depth,  varyiuo-  from  25  to  50  fathoms,  and  as  soon  as  she 
passes  Cape  Flatter}-  and  it  becomes  time  to  turn  sharply  to  the  east 
into  the  entrance  to  the  Straits  the  bottom  suddenly  drops  off  on  the 
correct  course  to  a  much  greater  depth,  giving  soundings  ranging 
from  120  to  180  fathoms;  and  any  master  who  has  maintained 
proper  relations  to  the  coast  before  passing  Umatilla  Light-ship  and 
is  getting  a  continuous  line  of  shallow  soundings,  keeping  between 
the  20  and  the  50  fathom  curve,  will  have  his  position  indicated  to 
him  with  substantial  certainty.  When  he  gets  over  this  "hole"  and 
finds  this  line  of  deep  soundings,  he  will  then  know  that  he  can  be 
in  but  one  i)lace  and  that  that  place  is  the  entrance  to  the  vStraits, 
and  he  can  then  turn  eastward  and  proceed  down  the  Straits. 

Captain  Johnson  failed  utterly  to  get  any  such  line  of  calculations, 
and,  not  getting  them,  he  should  have  been  put  very  much  on  his 
guard.  It  is  a  matter  of  mere  geograph}-,  as  he  very  well  knew, 
that  his  northward  course,  if  continued,  must  ultimately  run  him 
ashore  on  Vancouver  Island.  He  knew  that  the  coast  of  Vancouver 
was  somewhere  dead  ahead  of  him,  King  like  a  long  wall  almost 
directly  across  the  northward  course  that  he  was  maintaining  in 
coming  from  San  Francisco.  The  safct\'  of  any  vessel  on  this  course 
which  intends  to  enter  Puget  Sound  depends  upon  its  making  the 
turn  at  the  proper  time.  The  entrance  to  the  Straits  is  about  12 
miles  wide,  and  a  master  making  this  northerly  trip  knows  that  he 
nuist  either  turn  and  find  this  12-mile  entrance,  or,  if  he  continues 
his  course,  go  ashore  on  Vancouver  Island. 

With  this  certainty,  therefore,  that  Vancouver  Island  is  somewhere 
dead  ahead  on  the  northern  trip,  ordinar}-  regard  for  the  safety  of 
passengers  requires  that  the  utmost  caution  should  be  exercised 
when  approaching  this  entrance,  and  if  there  are  any  indications, 
either  through  soundings  or  current,  fog,  or  haze,  which  create  a 
doubt  as  to  the  vessel's  actual  position  the  vessel  should  be  laid  to 
or  headed  out  to  open  sea  until  its  position  can  be  absoluteh'  deter- 
mined. Considering  the  remoteness  of  Captain  Johnson's  last  point 
of  departure,  the  well-known  uncertain  character  of  the  currents, 
the  deflecting  effect  of  the  wind  and  sea,  and  the  peculiar  nature  of 
the  soundings  he  got,  he  should  have  taken  this  prudent  course. 

Such  action  Captain  Johnson  failed  to  take,  and  upon  his  improper 
navigation  in  this  respect  must  rest  the  primary  responsibility  for 
the  disaster. 


40  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

It  seems  very  clear  from  the  evidence,  as  well  as  from  the  experi- 
ence of  expert  masters,  that  Captain  Johnson  was  navigating  the 
vessel  in  an  nnscientific  and  crnde  fashion,  not  availing  himself  of 
accurate  means  of  information,  but  depending  apparently  more  on  his 
general  belief  that  the  vessel  would  arrive  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Straits  at  a  certain  time,  based  probably  on  his  previous  experience 
on  this  run.  This  haphazard  method  of  navigation  seems  almost 
incredible  upon  a  modern  passenger  vessel,  but  it  certainly  took 
place  in  this  case,  and  the  Commission  has  reason  to  believe  that 
other  masters  are  occasionally  guilty  of  similar  methods — in  navi- 
gating, as  one  master  testified,  b>'  "horse  sense,"  which  is  not  a 
satisfactory-  substitute  for  accurate  information  when  human  lives 
are  concerned. 

{e)  He  allowed  the  two  station  men  or  lookouts  to  keep  alternate 
watches  of  six  hours  each  in  length.  A  two-hour  watch  is  suffi- 
ciently long  for  safety,  and  four  hours  should  be  the  extreme. 

(/)  He  did  not  require  a  boat  drill  of  his  crew  and  was  not 
intending  to  have  one  probabh-  until  he  reached  Puget  Sound. 
One-half  the  crew  on  the  J'alencia  were  new  men,  and  thus  this 
omission  of  the  captain  nullified  to  a  large  extent  the  usefulness  of 
the  boat  equipment  so  far  as  this  trip  was  concerned. 

{g)  As  soon  as  the  vessel  struck,  instead  of  leaving  the  boats  in  their 
chocks,  where  they  would  not  have  been  interfered  with  by  the 
passengers,  he  directed  them  to  be  lowered  to  the  saloon  rail,  and 
thus  made  it  possible  for  them  to  be  taken  possession  of  by  the 
passengers  and  unskillfully  lowered  away  in  the  confusion,  and, 
although  he  ordered  the  boats  when  lowered  to  be  lashed  to  the  rail, 
he  took  nb  steps  to  see  that  this  was  done  or  to  protect  the  boats 
from  the  inrush  of  the  passengers. 

To  thus  place  the  boats  within  the  reach  and  control  of  excited 
pa.ssengers  would  have  been  justifiable  onh-  if  he  had  had  a  crew 
perfectly  trained  to  handle  and  guard  the  boats,  and  the  crew  training 
required  for  such  an  operation  would  be  rarel}-  found  on  an}-  merchant 
ves.sel  and  certainly  did  not  exist  on  the  l^alencia.  Considerable 
allowance,  however,  must  be  made  for  the  confusion  and  alarm  at 
this  time,  and  for  the  desire  of  the  captain  to  take  prompt  action. 

Captain  Johnson's  conduct  after  the  vessel  struck  and  the  boats 
had  been  lowered  was  satisfactory,  and  he  apparently  did  all  he 
could  for  the  safety  and  comfort  of  his  passengers,  and  showed 
courage  and  judgment. 

The  Commission  regrets  that  it  is  obliged  to  criticise  the  actions 
of  a  man  who  went  down  with  his  ship  and  who  is  unable  to  defend 


RKl'ORT    OF    CO.M.MISSIOX    OX   "VAIJ-.XCIA'     DISASTKR.  41 

himself;  l)nt  for  the  complete  uiKlerstandin<r  of  this  disaster  and  the 
proper  establishment  of  the  important  lessons  thereof  it  is  neces- 
sary to  call  attention  to  the  primar)-  causes  that  led  to  the  wreck 
and  the  loss  of  life,  so  that  they  may  be  impressed  in  the  future  upon 
masters  having  similar  responsibility,  and  so  that  such  masters  ma}- 
be  led  to  avail  themselves  of  all  possible  means  of  information. 

(2)  Excepting  possibly  her  bulkheads  and  one  set  of  davits,  the 
construction  and  equipment  of  the  Valencia.,  so  far  as  the  safety  of 
her  passengers  was  concerned,  was  Excellent,  and  none  of  the  loss 
of  life  was  due  to  any  defect  therein.  The  question  of  the  buoyant 
qualities  of  the  tule  life-preserver  is  one  for  determination  by  the 
Government,  and  inasmuch  as  such  life-preser\^ers  were  allowed  by 
the  regulations  no  blame  should  be  attributed  to  the  steamship 
company  for  having  them  on  board. 

(3)  The  measures  taken  by  the  steamship  company  to  send  vessels 
to  the  rescue  were  as  complete  as  possible  uilder  the  circumstances, 
with  the  single  exception  that  Captain  Cousins  should  have  been 
ordered  to  stop  at  Neah  Bay  on  his  way  down  to  the  wreck  with 
the  Quci'u^  so  as  to  pick  up  there,  if  possible,  any  available  seagoing 
tug  that  might  be  in  that  bay  or  vicinity.  Captain  Patterson  ad- 
mits in  his  testimony  that  when  he  received  news  of  the  wreck  he 
knew  (on  general  principles)  that  there  were  probably  one  or  more 
tugs  at  this  bay;  he  also  knew  that  the  wire  to  that  place  was  out 
of  order  and  that  the  tugs  could  not  be  reached  from  Seattle.  The 
Queen  actually  lay  in  the  mouth  of  the  Straits  from  about  10  o'clock 
Tuesday  night  until  early  Wednesday  morning,  within  15  or  20 
miles  of  Neah  Ba)-.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  tugs  at  this 
bay  at  the  time.  Either  Mr.  Pharo  or  Captain  Patterson  should 
have  directed  the  Queen  to  stop  at  Neah  Bay  for  a  tug  on  the  way 
down. 

While  this  was  a  serious  omission  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
results,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  this  point  was  overlooked  in  the 
haste  and  confusion  of  the  short  period,  perhaps  an  hour  and  a  half, 
from  the  time  the  news  of  the  wreck  was  received  at  the  Seattle 
office  initil  the  time  the  Queen  left  Victoria,  and  the  officials  of  the 
steamship  company  can  hardly  be  severely  criticised  for  overlooking 
this  precaution.  It  is  onl}^  fair  to  say  that  the  company  exerted 
itself  very  vigorous!}'  in  the  recovery  of  bodies,  in  pro\-iding  cloth- 
ing and  lodgings  for  the  survivors,  and  in  all  measures  of  relief,  at  a 
total  expense  to  the  company  of  over  $15,000. 

(4)  The  order  given  to  the  Queen  from  the  Topeka  at  1 1  o'clock 
Wednesday  morning  off  the  wreck  to  leave  the  scene  and  return  to 


42  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

Victoria  was  wrong.  The  Commission  believes  that,  as  a  matter  of 
legal  right,  ^Ir.  Pharo  was  the  supreme  authority  on  the  spot  in 
regard  to  an  order  of  this  nature.  Captain  Patterson,  who  was  on 
the  bridge  of  the  Topeka  with  ]\Ir.  Pharo  when  the  order  was  given, 
and  who  actually  delivered  it  through  the  megaphone,  admits  in  his 
testimony  that  he  (Patterson)  was  "  the  original  suggester  of  the 
order."  This  is  probable,  inasmuch  as  Captain  Patterson  was  a 
master  of  wide  experience  and  excellent  ability  in  matters  of  navi- 
gation, and  doubtless  Mr.  Pharo  relied  upon  him  for  practical  judg- 
ment in  these  matters.  The  Commission  therefore  believes  that  the 
legal  responsibility  for  this  order  rests  upon  ]\Ir.  Pharo  and  the 
moral  responsibility  upon  Captain  Patterson,  and  that  both  of  them 
are  hig-hlv  censurable  for  having  issued  or  sanctioned  this  order. 

It  is  hard  to  understand  the  motive  for  this  order.  Probably  it 
was  the  desire  that  the  Queen  should  return  and  resume  her  regular 
business  in  the  commercial  interests  of  the  company,  though  it  must 
be  said  that  the  Pacific  Coast  Steamship  Company,  throughout  the 
entire  matter,  seems  to  have  spared  no  effort  or  expense,  except  in 
this  one  case,  to  effect  a  rescue  and  to  relieve  the  survivors.  Both 
of  these  men  argued  on  the  witness  stand  that  upon  the  arrival  of 
the  Topeka^  which  drew  17  feet,  the  presence  of  the  Qiieen^  draw- 
ing 21  feet,  was  no  longer  of  any  use,  as  she  was  unable  to  go  in  as 
shallow  water  as  the  Topeka^  and  being  a  larger  vessel  was  less 
easily  handled,  and  that  inasmuch  as  only  one  vessel  was  needed 
there  the  Topeka  was  the  one  that  should  have  remained.  This 
argument  shows  the  error  in  their  entire  position. 

There  ivas  need  for  as  many  vessels  there  as  amid  be  gotten. 
When  the  Topeka  arrived  alongside  the  Qneen^  the  Qneen  had  not, 
by  reason  of  the  haze,  seen  the  wreck  for  nearly  an  hour.  The 
immediate  question  was,  therefore,  not  one  of  rescue  but  of  finding 
the  wreck;  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Topeka  during  the  rest  of 
that  afternoon  patrolled  a  beat  of  6  or  8  miles  up  and  down  the 
coast  over  and  over  again  in  the  \'ain  attempt  to  find  the  wreck. 
Furthermore,  Messrs.  Logan  and  Daykin  testified  that  when  the 
wreck  broke  up,  about  an  hour  after  the  departure  of  the  Qiieen^  a 
number  of  those  still  remaining  on  the  wreck,  and  all  having  life- 
preservers  on,  floated  out  to  sea.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that,  had 
the  Queen  remained,  twice  as  much  ground  could  have  been  covered 
by  the  patrol  in  the  attempt  to  find  the  wreck,  and  the  officers  of 
the  Qneen  had  the  best  knowledge  of  where  the  wreck  was,  and 
thus  there  would  have  been  more  than  double  the  chance  of  finding 


REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER.  43 

the  wreck,  and  also  this  would  have  doubled  the  chance  of  picking 
u\)  some  of  the  sunivors  floating  seaward  from  the  wreck. 

It  might  easily  have  happened  that  while  the  Topcka  was  engaged 
in  her  vain  search  westward  the  Queen,  had  she  been  there,  might, 
by  going  in  the  other  direction,  have  located  the  wreck  again  and 
picked  up  a  number  of  these  last  victims.  It  is  of  course  impossible 
to  sa)'  whether  the  retention  of  the  Queen  at  the  scene  of  the  wreck 
would  have  saved  any  lives,  but  it  is  equalh-  hard  to  see  wh\-,  under 
the  circumstances  and  in  view  of  the  possibilities,  she  was  not 
ordered  to  remain. 

(5)  The  officers  of  the  Topeka  never  saw  the  wreck  and  therefore 
could  take  no  means  of  rescue.  The  officers  of  the  Queen,  how- 
ever, were  in  sight  of  the  wreck  for  about  an  hour  (during  part  of 
which  time  they  were  occupied,  it  is  true,  with  conversations  with 
the  Czar),  and  the  question  of  sending  boats  to  the  wreck  was  dis- 
cussed by  the  officers  of  the  Queen  and  the  masters  and  pilots  on 
board,  and  was  unanimously  decided  in  the  negative.  This  failure 
to  make  an  attempt  to  send  boats  to  the  wreck,  or  to  drift  a  raft  to 
it,  or  to  get  a  line  to  it,  raises  a  question  which,  of  all  others,  the 
Commission  found  most  difficult  to  decide.  Undoubtedly  the  sea 
was  of  considerable  strength  and  the  coast  dangerous,  there  being 
apparenth-  a  continuous  line  of  breakers  between  them  and  the 
Valencia. 

Unquestionably  the  men  on  board  the  Queen,  as  a  matter  of  com- 
mon humanity,  desired  to  do  the  best  they  could  to  effect  a  rescue; 
no  men  in  their  position  could  have  felt  otherwise.  On  the  other 
hand,  from  the  incontestable  experience  of  the  boat  and  the  life- 
rafts  from  the  Valencia,  the  Commission  believes  that  there  was  a 
fair  chance  of  establishing  communication  with  the  wreck  either  by 
w^ay  of  boats  or  h\  drifting  a  raft  to  her,  but  the  men  on  the  Queen 
knew  nothing  at  the  time  of  the  experience  of  these  rafts,  and  there 
was  doubtless  considerable  justification  from  their  standpoint  for 
their  belief  that  the  establishment  of  this  communication  was  prac- 
tically impossible. 

It  was  practically  the  unanimous  opinion  of  a  large  number  of 
witnesses  that  the  ordinar>-  lifeboats  could  have  been  safel>-  taken 
in  toward  the  wreck  as  long  as  they  kept  outside  of  the  line  of 
breakers.  Outside  of  this  line  the  sea  was  not  combing  or  break- 
ing, and  small  boats  would  have  been  perfectly  safe.  This  line  of 
breakers  was  probably  not  more  than  from  100  to  200  yards  out 
from  the  bow^  of  the    Valencia.     Had  the  Queen  and  the   Topeka 


44  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

both  remained  on  the  spot,  and  had  the  wreck  been  again  located,  a 
number  of  boats  might  have  been  held  just  outside  the  line  of 
breakers,  and  some  of  the  survivors  drifting  seaward  would  have 
been  picked  up.  Furthermore,  had  this  close  approach  been  made 
to  the 'line  of  breakers  with  the  boats  the  men  in  them  might  have 
seen  reason  to  change  their  opinion  that  a  boat  could  not  be  gotten 
through  the  breakers,  and  a  rescue  might  have  thus  been  attempted 
directly  to  the  wTeck.  Moreover,  had  boats  been  thus  sent  in  to 
the  line  of  breakers  before  the  wreck  was  again  located,  its  location 
might  have  been  ascertained  in  this  way.  But  for  some  reason  no 
boats  were  lowered  for  this  purpose.  It  was  claimed  by  some  wit- 
nesses that  it  was  unsafe  to  lower  a  boat  from  the  Queen  on  that 
day,  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Topeka  did  lower  a  boat  with  safet}- 
and  without  difhculty  about  an  hour  later  to  pick  up  the  raft. 

On  this  point,  therefore,  the  Commission  desires  to  express  no 
opinion,  but  is  compelled  to  observe  that  there  was  certainly  no 
display  of  the  heroic  daring  that  has  often  marked  other  such  emer- 
gencies in  our  merchant  marine. 

(6)  As  to  the  conduct  of  the  Czar  and  the  Salvor,  the  Commis- 
sion is  under  certain  peculiar  restrictions  in  stating  any  definite 
conclusions.  These  vessels  are  not  of  American  registry  and  their 
officers  are  not  subject  to  American  laws.  Furthermore,  they  owed 
no  duty  under  the  circumstances  except  that  of  ordinary  humanity; 
and,  finally,  with  one  exception,  none  of  the  officers  of  these  vessels 
appeared  before  the  Commission.  Also,  a  conflict  of  testimony  exists 
as  to  whether  the  Csar,  when  she  left  the  scene  of  the  wreck,  knew 
there  was  life  on  board  the  wreck  or  had  anv  reason  to  think  it 
possible. 

The  established  facts,  therefore,  are  that  the  Czar,  in  company 
with  the  Salvor,  lay  off  the  wreck  near  the  Queen  while  the 
wreck  was  visible ;  that  the  Czar  approached  within  possibly  a  mile 
or  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  wreck  ;  that  she  shipped  considerable 
water ;  that  she  came  back  at  once  to  the  Queen  and  reported  that 
there  was  no  life  on  the  wreck ;  that  Captain  Cousins  told  her  that 
there  was  life  there  ;  that  it  is  uncertain  whether  the  officers  of  the 
Czar  understood  tliis  information  ;  that  the  Czar  then  stated  that 
she  was  "going  for  shelter,"  and  in  company  with  the  Salvor  left 
the  scene  while  the  wreck  was  still  visible.  Any  judgment  of  this 
conduct  of  the  Czar  and  the  Salvor  must  turn  about  the  one  point 
as  to  whether  the  captain  of  the  Czar  knew  there  was  life  on  the 
wreck  or  w^hcther  he  had  anv  reason  whatsoever  to  consider  it 
le. 


RKPORT    OF    COM.M1S.SIOX    UX   "  VAIJCXCIA"  UlSASTUR.  45 

Two  witnesses  on  the  Qitccu  swear  to  a  discussion  between  the 
Quccii  and  the  Czar  as  to  this  question  of  life  upon  the  wreck,  and 
if  this  discussion  actually  took  place  it  of  course  must  have  raised 
at  least  a  question  of  doubt  in  the  mind  of  the  captain  of  the 
Czar.  The  Commission  believes  that  on  the  evidence  as  submitted 
to  it  the  captain  of  the  Czar  had  sufficient  information,  either  of 
his  own  or  from  the  Qiwcn^  to  raise  a  doubt  at  least  in  his  mind  as 
to  this  point.  The  Sah'or  had  no  conversation  with  the  Queen., 
and  acted  solely  upon  what  the  Czar  told  her.  A  witness  who  was 
present  on  the  Salvor  testified  thus,  the  transcrij^t  of  testimony, 
questions  and  answers,  reading  as  follows: 

O.  I  am  after  this  point,  Captain:  The  Qxieeii  told  the  Ci^rr emphatic- 
ally that  there  was  life  on  the  wreck ;  the  Czar  came  and  reported  to 
the  Queen  that  there  was  not,  and  the  Queen  said  there  was.  Now,  did 
the  Czar  report  to  you  what  the  Queen  said  about  it? — A.   No,  sir. 

Q.  Said  nothing  about  the  belief  of  the  Queen  ? — A.  Xo ;  not  at  that 
time. 

Q.   Did  she  later  on? — A.   Yes;  at  Bamfield. 

Q.  What  did  .she  say  at  Bamfield? — A.  Captain  Troupe  was  talking 
with  Captain  Christensen,  and  I  was  on  deck  alongside  of  him,  and 
Captain  Christen.sen  stated  emphatically  that  he  could  not  see  any  signs 
of  life  on  the  wreck;  and  he  mentioned  then  that  they  had  spoke  about 
it  on  the  Queen,  and  .said  that  they  had  heard  three  .shots  fired.  Captain 
Troupe  was  rather  put  out  about  it,  and  he  went  in  to  speak  to  the 
others  on  board  a])out  it — Captain  Cox  and  Mr.  BuUen.  Pilot  Camp- 
bell was  standing  on  the  deck  of  the  tug,  and  I  a.sked  him,  and  he  .seemed 
to  have  some  doubt  as  to  life  being  on  board  the  ship.  As  soon  as  I 
knew  that  I  told  Captain  Troupe,  "  Campbell  is  not  so  sure  as  to  whether 
there  is  life  on  the  vessel  or  not."  "Well,"  Captain  Troupe  .said,  "if 
there  is  any  doubt  about  it  we  will  just  get  to  work."  So  we  formed 
our  rescue  party  right  then  and  sent  the  Czar  for  the  whaler. 

Captain  Troupe,  referred  to  in  the  above  conversation,  was  in  charo-e 
of  the  Salvor.^  Captain  Chri.stensen_  master  of  the  Czar.,  and  Camp- 
bell pilot  of  the  Czar. 

These  men,  the  officers  of  the  Czar  and  the  Salvor,  are  Canadian 
citizens,  and  the  Commission  does  not  deem  it  proper  to  criticise  the 
conduct  of  other  than  American  citizens,  but  considers  that  its  duty 
has  been  done  in  this  matter  when  it  has  stated  what  it  believes  to 
be  the  facts. 

(7)  From  the  personal  examination  made  by  the  Commi.ssion  of 
the  Steamboat-Inspection  Service  at  Seattle  and  the  officers  thereof, 
and  from  the  results  of  the  very  thorough  reinspection,  b\-  na\al 
officers  detailed  for  that  purpose,  of  35  vessels  coming  into  the  port 
of  Seattle  about  the  time  of  the  hearings  there,  the  Commission 
finds,  with  a  few  minor  exceptions,  that  the  condition  of  the  Steam- 
boat-Inspection Service  at  this  port  is  excellent  in  point  of  efficiency. 


46  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

(8)  Reserving  the  most  important  conclnsion  for  the  last,  the 
Commission  desires  to  emphasize,  as  the  primary  and  greatest  cause 
of  the  loss  of  life,  the  defective  state  of  the  aids  to  navigation  and 
preservation  of  life  in  the  shape  of  light-houses,  fog  signals,  life- 
saving  equipment,  and  means  of  communication  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  wreck. 

Owing  to  the  peculiar  weather  conditions  at  the  entrance  to  the 
Straits,  the  Valencia  was  navigating  in  a  haze  which  prevented  her 
from  seeing  the  lights,  while  at  Cape  Flatter)'  Light  itself  the 
weather  was  clear  and  the  fog  signals  were  not  sounding ;  in  other 
words,  the  most  important  light  in  this  entire  course,  to  wit,  that  on 
Cape  Flattery,  is  not  placed  in  the  zone  where,  by  reason  of  the  fog 
and  the  thick  weather,  the  greatest  danger  lies. 

The  nearest  United  States  life-saving  station  is  on  the  south  side 
of  Grays  Harbor,  no  miles  away  from  the  wreck,  and  therefore 
absolutely  inadequate  to  cover  this  dangerous  locality. 

The  telegraphic  communications  from  Cape  Flattery  and  Neah 
Bay  are  of  the  most  precarious  kind,  the  wires  being  strung  on  trees 
and  continualh'  out  of  order  through  falling  trees  and  other  acci- 
dents,  and  when  needed  to  secure  tugs  from  Neah  Bay  to  go  to  the 
w-reck  the  wire  was  out  of  order. 

This  part  of  Vancouver  Island  is  substantially  an  almost  impene- 
trable wilderness,  wdth  nothing  of  civilization  in  the  interior  in  this 
vicinity  and  only  a  few  inhabited  points  along  the  coast.  Almost 
a  similar  condition  exists  on  the  coast  of  the  State  of  Washington, 
though  somewhat  more  inhabited. 

In  order  to  satisfy  the  just  desire  of  the  public  in  regard  to  all 
details  of  this  disaster,  the  Commission  has,  as  above  indicated,  stated 
its  belief  as  to  any  points  where  lack  of  human  effort  or  errors  in 
judgment  on  the  part  of  private  individuals  contributed  to  loss  of 
life;  but  when  all  that  is  possible  has  been  said  in  this  direction,  it 
must  be  frankly  admitted  that  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  respon- 
sibility for  .such  loss  of  life  lies  upon  the  fundamental  natural  con- 
ditions inherent  in  tlifsTbcality,  and  that  the  extent  of  this  disaster 
was  in  largel'neaslire  due  to  the  permanent  and  unavoidable  perils 
of  the  sea;  that  the  question  is  by  far  more  one  of  navigation  and 
the  safeguarding  of  the  coast  and  the  waterways  than  of  anything 
el.se,  and  that  the  only  source  from  which  any  substantial  correction 
of  such  evils  can  come  is  the  Federal  Government.  Therefore, 
earnestly  holding  this  belief,  the  Commission  has  hereinafter  set 
forth  its  recommendations  for  action  b\'  the  Government. 


REPORT   OF   COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER.  47 

It  is  necessary  and  proper  to  establish  responsibilit}'  in  connec- 
tion with  this  disaster  and  to  censnre  any  who  may  have  been  in 
fault,  but  this  will  not  restore  the  lives  of  the  victims  nor  will  it 
protect  passenger  traffic  in  the  future.  If  such  a  terrible  disaster 
must  occur,  it  must  be  regarded  primarih-  in  the  nature  of  a  les.son 
for  the  future — a  lessonnot  to  be  disregarded — and  if  the  Govern- 
ment, acting  upon  this  lesson,  shall  make  all  reasonable  provisions 
within  its  power  for  the  safeguarding  of  this  coast,  the  victims  of 
the  Valencia  will  not  have  perished  in  vain. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

RECOMMENDATIONS. 

The  Commission  desires  to  make  certain  recommendations,  as  a 
result  of  its  investigation,  for  the  better  protection  of  life  and  prop- 
erty involved  in  traffic  on   Aiget  Sound  and  the  entrance  to  the 
Straits.     In  order  to  bring  the  matter  at  once  to  the  attention  of  the 
public,  the  Connnission,  as  soon   as  it   adjourned   its  hearings  in 
Seattle,   issued  a  brief  statement   of  recommendations,   and   these 
recommendations,  with  additional  ones,  will  now  be  taken  up  and 
tlie  reasons  for  them  given. 
^V      /      (^)  Such  changes  should  be  made  in  the  present  equipment,  if 
\  .,  '•  ■  'U  any  such  are  needed,  at  Cape  Flatter}-  Light  as  will  insure  the  exist- 
V-  I    ence  there  of  a  light  of  the  first  order  and  of  the  highest  possible 

\  efficiency,  and  a  fog  signal  also  of  the  highest  possible  efficiency. 
The  details  of  such  improvements  are  a  matter  for  the  expert  con- 
sideration of  the  Light-House  Board.  The  Commission  merely 
desires  to  suggest  the  possible  value  of  the  installation  of  a  vertical 
beam  of  light  at  this  place.  It  is  understood  that  the  Light-House 
Board  will  try  a  siren  there,  and  if  it  is  more  effective  than  the  fog 
whistle  it  will  be  installed  permanently. 

(2)  Umatilla  Reef  Light-ship.     Such  changes  should  be  made  in 
V;-    the  present  equipment  of  this  light-ship,  if  any  such  are  needed, 

as  will  insure  the  existence  there  of  a  light  of  the  first  order  and  of 
the  highest  possible  efficiency,^  and  a  fog  signal  of  the  highest  pos- 
sible efficiency,  the  details  to  be  left  for  the  consideration  of  the 
Light-House  Board. 

(3)  There  should  be  established  a  light-ship  to^be  anchored  on 
the  so-called  "Forty  Fathom  Bank"  off  the  entrance  to  the  Straits, 
at  a  point  about  14  miles  from  Cape  Flattery,  north  60°  west,  mag- 
netic. The  light  should  be  of  the  first  order,  with  corresponding 
fog  signal. 

It  is  believed  that  tlic  reasons  for  the  above  recommendations 
have  been  brought  out  with  considerable  emphasis  in  the  preceding 
part  of  this  report  and  that  the  Valencia  wreck  is  a  forcible  illustra- 
tion of  such  reasons.     Briefly  stated,  they  are  as  follows: 

This  entrance  to  Puget  Sound  through  the  Straits  of  Juan  de  Fuca 
is  probably  the  most  important  single  entrance  on  the  Pacific  coast. 
48 


REPORT   OF   COMMISSION    OX  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 


49 


The  Coiiiniission  believes,  from  various  estimates,  that  from  5,000,000 
to  6,000,000  tons  of  traffic'  a  year  pass  through  this  entrance,  and  the 
importance  thereof  is  rapidly  increasing.  A  number  of  important 
steamship  lines,  both  passenger  and  freight,  to  the  Orient,  and  a 
vast  amount  of  coastwise  shipping  between  the  more  southern  ports 
on  the  Pacific  coast  and  {Seattle,  Tacoma,  Everett,  Bellingham, 
Victoria,  and  other  important  Puget  Sound  cities,  pass  over  this 
course. 

The  dangers^  this  entrance  are  out  of  all  proportion  to  the 
present  .ligiit-hpuse_and. fog-signal  equipment.  The  conditions  of 
coast  and  weather  are  wholly  different  from  those  prevailing  on 
the  Atlantic  coast ;  the  coast  itself  js  bluff  and  rockv ;  deep  sound- 
ings may  be  obtained  close  inshore  and  are  therefore  of  little  value 
in  determining  a  ship's  position,  and  throughout  at  least  one-half 
the  year  fogs  and  haze  prevail  in  this  vicinity,  and  these  fogs  lie  in 
such  peculiar  formations  that,  as  was  the  case  with  the  Jalencia^ 
vessels  offshore  may  be  in  a  fog  or  haze  while  the  shore  lights  are 
in  clear  weather  and  their  keepers  have  no  knowledge  that  the  fog 
is  in  existence  and  hence  do  not  operate  their  fog  signals.  It  is  also 
well  known,  by  experiments  of  the  Light-House  Board  made  on  the 
Atlantic  coast,  that  the  radiation  of  sound  from  fog  si<rnals  is 
extremely  erratic  and  that  such  signals  can  not  be  relied  upon,  nor 
is  it  even  possible  to  determine  decisively  the  causes  of  these  aber- 
rations. The  Commission  itself,  while  cruising  off  Cape  Flattery 
Light  in  comparatively  clear  weather,  at  a  distance  westerly  of  a 
mile  and  a  quarter,  saw  repeatedly  the  steam  issue  from  the  fog 
signal  at  the  light  as  it  was  blowing,  but  could  not  hear  the  signal. 

This  entrance  to  the  Straits  is  of  somewhat  peculiar  geographic 
nature,  as  will  be  obser\'ed  from  the  chart  in  this  report.  The  west 
shore  of  Vancouver  Island  lies  almost  directly  across  the  inward 
course  of  steamers  coming  there  from  the  Orient  and  especially  of 
those  coming  from  down  the  coast.  In  case  of  steamers  coming 
from  down  the  coast,  the\-  must  proceed  up  the  coast  headed  directly 
toward  Vancouver  Island,  and,  upon  reaching  Cape  Flattery,  must 
then  turn  sharph-  to  the  eastward  and  find  the  entrance  to  the 
Straits,  which  is  about  12  miles  wide,  and  if  this  turn  is  not  made 
at  the  proper  time,  as  was  the  case  with  the  Valencia^  the  vessel 
must  inevitably  go  ashore  on  the  Vancouver  coast.  ^-v/"^-     -• 


Evidence  covering  a  period  from  1855  to  1890,  exhibited  to  the 
Commission,  showed  wrecks  of  35  vessels  in  as  many  years  on  the 
west  shore  of  Vancouver  in  this  vicinity,  all  of  which  vessels  had  been 

25639—06 4 


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f 


50  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

trying  to  make  this  entrance  to  the  Straits;  and  since  1890  at  least 
as  large  an  additional  proportion  of  vessels"  has  gone  ashore  there,  so 
it  is  safe  to  say  thkt  at  least  an  average  of  one  wreck  a  }-ear  occnrs 
in  this  locality,  and  probably  dnring  the  time  these  records  have 
been  kept  in  the  last  fifty  years  between  500  and  700  lives  have  been 
lost  there,  to  say  nothing  of  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  property. 
Cape  Flattery,  therefore,  and  its  immediate  vicinit)-  is  the  key  or 
turning  point  of  the  entrance  to  the  vStraits  and  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  navigators. 

There  exist  also  currents  in  this  locality,  and  as  far  down  as  San 
Francisco,  which  vary  in  force  and  direction  with  the  varying  sea- 
sons of  the  }ear,  and  also,  witliin  a  gi\'en  season,  var)-  with  the 
different  conditions  of  the  wind,  and  are  further  complicated  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Straits  by  the  strong  tides  there,  and  these  currents 
are  at  present  very  little  understood,  even  by  those  who  navigate 
them  constantly.  The  fact  that  the  Valencia  w^as  off  her  course  was 
primarily  due  to  the  existence  of  such  a  northward  current. 

These  facts  emphasize  particularly  the  need  for  a  light-ship  on 
Forty-Fathom  Bank.  This  light-ship  would  be  sufficienth'  offshore 
to  be  substantially  in  the  course  of  those  vessels  that  have  gone 
ashore  on  Vancouver  through  missing  the  Straits,  and  would  also  be 
in  the  region  of  haze  and  fog  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  either 
Cape  Flattery  Light  or  Carmanah  Light  (which  is  on  Vancouver, 
directly  across  from  Cape  Flattery  Light),  so  that  the  conditions 
around  the  light-ship  in  this  respect  would  be  much  more  nearly 
the  same  as  the  conditions  met  by  the  average  incoming  vessel. 

(4)  A  first-class,  ocean-going,  life-saving  steamer  or  tug  officered 
and  manned  by  the  most  skillful  life-saving  crew  available,  should 
be  stationed  at  Neah  Bay,  which  is  within  5  miles  of  Cape  Flattery 
and  the  entrance  to  the  Straits,  and  the  only  available  harbor  in  that 
locality,  to  be  equipped  wuth  the  best  possible  appliances  of  surf- 
boats  and  lifeboats,  with  a  wireless  telegraph  apparatus.  The 
Commission  understands  that  a  bill  for  this  purpose  has  already 
passed  the  Senate  and  has  been  favorably  reported  by  the  House 
committee.  In  conjunction  with  this  there  should  be  a  telegraph 
and  telephone  line  skirting  the  coast  from  the  life-saving  station 
at  Grays  Harbor,  passing  through  the  light  station  at  Cape 
Flattery,  to  Neah  Bay,  thence  to  the  nearest  town  on  Puget 
vSound.  This  wire  should  run  along  a  practicable  foot  trail,  which 
should  be  kept  open  continuously  and  marked  at  frequent  intervals 
by  signboards  indicating   the   locality   and   direction,  and    should 


REPORT    OF   C0M:\IISSI0X    OX   '' \ALENCIA"  DISASTER.  5I 

enter  intermediate  telegraph  and  teleplione  huts  at  intervals  of  a  few- 
miles  along  the  said  line  of  wire. 

(5)  A  system  of  wireless  stations  .should  be  established,  including 
stations  at  Cape  Flattery  Light,  Point  Wilson  or  Point  Partridge, 
Seattle,  and  at  the  Puget  Sound  Navy  Yard,  and  al.so  down  the 
Pacific  coast  at  least  to  Grays  Harbor.  The  Commission  is  advised 
that  the  Navy  Department  has  now  in  course  of  building  a  wireless 
station  at  Cape  Flatter}-  and  that  it  has  appropriations  already 
granted  for  Point  Wilson  and  Seattle.  If  this  be  done  b\-  the  Navy 
Department,  it  will  fulfill  the  requirements  of  this  recommendation. 

The  reasons  for  the  two  foregoing  recommendations  are  al.so,  it  is 
believed,  fairly  obvious  from  the  preceding  parts  of  this  report.  The 
life-saving  tug  is  the  only  practicable  form  of  life-.saving  service  in 
this  localit}-.  Comnninication  overland  by  life-saving  equipment 
from  a  given  station,  such  as  is  practiced  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  is 
ab.solutely  "impossible,  owing  to  the  uninhabited  nature  of  the  conn- 
try  and  the  total  lack  of  roads  and  footpaths.  The  nearest  life- 
saving  station  to  Cape  F'latter)-  is  now  at  Grays  Harbor,  90  miles 
south,  and  for  any  use  at  Cape  Flattery  the  Grays  Harbor  station 
might  as  well  be  at  Boston.  A  life-saving  crew  and  equipment  in 
this  \icinity  must  be  able  to  proceed  by  water  to  points  of  emer- 
genc}',  and  ina.smuch  as  it  must  cover  a  radius  of  at  least  30  or  40 
miles  navigation  must  be  by  steam.  The  vessel  should  be  equipped 
with  wireless  telegraph,  .so  that  vessels  similarly  equipped  may 
communicate  with  it. 

It  is  believed  by  the  Commission,  based  upon  the  as.snrances  of 
important  steamboat  interests  on  this  coast,  that  as  .soon  as  the 
Government  establishes  wireless  outfits  at  Cape  Flattery  wireless 
apparatus  will  also  be  installed  on  a  large  number  of  steamers  on 
this  coast,  so  that  intelligence  can  be  transmitted  from  them  to  the 
light-house  at  Cape  Flattery  and  also  to  this  proposed  new  life-sav- 
ing tug  at  Neah  Bay.  The  question  of  communication  was  one 
which  played  a  very  serious  part  in  the  /  'a/rncia  disaster.  Had 
there  been  a  wireless  apparatus  at  Cape  P'lattery  at  that  time  it  is 
almost  certain  that  rescue  tugs  could  have  been  at  the  .scene  of  the 
wreck  h\  Tuesda\-  evenino-,  at  least  twelve  hours  before  the  rescue 
fleet  actually  got  there  and  if  the  Valencia  had  also  been  equipped 
with  wireless  apparatus  the  rescue  tugs  could  probably  have  been 
at  the  scene  of  the  wreck  early  Tuesday  morning. 

(6)  The  entire  Pacific  coast,  including  the  coast  of  Alaska,  is  now 
comprised  within  two  light-house  districts  with  three  light-house 
tenders.     At  least  one  new  light-house  district  should  be  established 


52  REPORT    OF    COMMISSION    OX  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER. 

in  order  to  accomplish  anything  like  a  proper  supervision  of  this 
territory.  Upon  a  comparatively  equal  stretch  of  coast  on  the 
Atlantic,  there  are  eight  light-house  districts,  with  thirty-eight 
light-house  tenders  of  various  sizes. 

(7)  There  should  be  made  and  published  a  careful  series  of  obser- 
vations of  the  currents  along  this  coast  during  at  least  a  period  of 
one  year  and  covering  all  possible  conditions  of  season,  weather,  and 
wdnds,  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  whether  any  definite  rules  can  be 
established  for  the  guidance  of  mariners  as  to  the  operations  of  these 
currents.  This  work  could  be  taken  up  directlv  in  connection  with 
the  work  of  the  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey  and  only  a  compara- 
tively small  appropriation  would  be  necessary  to  enable  the  Survey 
to  caiT}-  it  out. 

(8)  The  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor  should  continue  its 
exhaustive  series  of  tests  as  to  the  merits  of  the  tule  life-preserver, 
and  collect  information  thereon  from  all  possible  sources  and  sub- 
mit all  the  tests  already  made,  and  hereafter  to  be  made,  to  the 
Board  of  Supervising  Inspectors. 

(9)  Regulations  should  be  formulated  b)-  the  Department  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  directing  the  officials  of  the  Steamboat-Inspec- 
tion Service  to  require,  so  far  as  possible  in  their  localities,  a  uniform 
system  of  signals  for  boat  and  fire  drills  oh  steam  vessels,  so  that 
sailors  shifting  from  one  \-essel  to  another,  as  they  constanth-  do, 
ma)'  find  the  same  system  on  board  all  vessels. 

(10)  Steamship  owners  should  require  their  masters  and  navi- 
gating officers  to  procure  and  have  on  board  the  best  and  most 
modern  charts  and  all  the  publications  of  Government  bureaus 
bearing  upon  questions  of  navigation,  currents,  winds,  tides,  etc., 
and  should  see  that  the  navigating  officers  use  and  become  familiar 
with  all  these  sources  of  information. 

(11)  The  Commission  also  recommends  that  masters  be  required 
by  regulation  to  have  their  fire  and  boat  drills  as  soon  as  reasonably 
possible  after  leaving  port. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

Lawrence  O.  Murrav, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor ^ 

Chairman. 
William  T.  Burwell, 

Captain^  U.  S.  Navy^ 
Co7nmandant  of  Piiget  Sound  lYavy  Yard. 

Herbert  Knox  Smith, 
Deputy  Commissioner  of  Corporations^ 

Secretary  of  Commission. 


REPORT   OF    COMMISSION    ON  "VALENCIA"  DISASTER.  53 

I  desire  to  recommend  also  that  a  system  be  established  of  frequent 
transfers  of  local  inspectors  from  one  port  to  another;  and  that  addi- 
tional life-saving  stations  be  provided  on  this  coast  supplemental 
to  the  proposed  life-saving  vessel  for  Neah  Ba)-,  and  that  some 
provision  be  made  for  sufficient  manning  of  vessels  by  seamen. 

William  T.  Burwell, 

Captain^  U.  S.  Navy^ 
Commaiidant  of  Piiget  Sound  Navy  Yard. 

To  the  President. 

O 


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